CITIZENS OF AN ENEMY LAND: ENEMY
COMBATANTS, ALIENS, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE PSEUDO-CITIZEN
Juliet Stumpf*

Does citizenship as we know it still exist in the post-September 11
world? Do the exigencies of war require a more cautious approach in deciding
who among the citizenry is legitimately a citizen? The Supreme Court has
granted certioriari in two cases that resolve these questions in opposite ways.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld1 and Padilla v. Rumsfeld2 each raise constitutional
challenges to the military’s detention of a U.S. citizen accused of taking
actions against the U.S. government in a time of war.3 In Hamdi, the Fourth
Circuit resolved these challenges against the U.S. citizen.4 Emphasizing
Hamdi’s ties with foreigners and foreign lands and his tenuous connection
with the United States, the opinion applied precedent relating to non-citizens
to evaluate the citizen’s constitutional claims.5 In Padilla, the Second Circuit
held the military detention unconstitutional.6 Characterizing Padilla as a
prototypical member of the citizenry, as an “American citizen seized on
American soil,” it declined to apply doctrines created to govern the noncitizen.7
This article exposes the radical redefining of citizenship augured in the
recent case law addressing citizens suspected of disloyalty. Cases in which
the military has detained U.S. citizens on the suspicion that they are “enemy
combatants” have blurred the distinctions between citizens and non-citizens.
Rules that grew out of jurisprudence about non-citizens have crept into
decisions in which the government has questioned the legitimacy and loyalty
of citizens. The appearance of these rules and their implications for
citizenship have gone virtually unnoticed by advocates and critics of the
enemy combatant cases. Yet the presence of these rules accompanies the
*
Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law. Thanks to Kim Barry, Dr. Jerome Bruner,
Peggy Cooper Davis, Barry Friedman, Mary Holland, Marshall Miller, Jenny Roberts, Peter Schuck, Michael
Wishnie, Frank Wu, and commenters at the NYU Criminal Law Lunch workshop, the NYU Lawyering Faculty
Workshop and the Juniors Summer Writing Group. Thanks also to Diana Bieber, Rachel Finkelstein, and Diana
Yoon for excellent research assistance.
1
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003).
2
Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 699 (2d Cir. 2003).
3
Id. at 699; Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 470-71.
4
Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 470-71.
5
Id. at 460, 470-71, 474.
6
Padilla, 352 F.3d at 699.
7
Id. at 711-24.

2

Juliet Stumpf

9-Mar-04

courts’ sub rosa evaluation of whether the citizen is legitimately a member of
the citizenry. Together, they effectively create a hybrid category of
citizenship – what I call “pseudo-citizenship ,” to which lesser constitutional
protections against federal power apply.
This article reframes the current heated debate about these cases. That
debate has polarized as a conflict between the power of the federal
government in wartime and the scope of constitutional protections for
citizens.8 Recast as a debate about the very substance of citizenship, radically
different questions arise. Is there room in our constitutional framework for a
new category of citizenship that draws from constitutional norms governing
non-citizens? Should the courts make room for a jurisprudence of pseudocitizenship in a world in which traditional notions of war and conflict no
longer seem to apply?
INTRODUCTION
On May 8, 2002, upon landing at Chicago’s O’Hare International
Airport, José Padilla was arrested in connection with a grand jury investigation
into the September 11 attacks.9 Padilla is a U.S. citizen, born in Brooklyn,
New York.10 He grew up in Brooklyn and Chicago and moved to Florida as a
young adult.11 Family friends and others remember him as a handsome, quiet
boy who played basketball in the street and was close to his mother.12 As a
teen and later an adult, he apparently joined a gang13 and acquired a criminal
record that included a juvenile conviction for murder and later a weapons
charge.14 He converted from Roman Catholicism to Islam at some point along
the way.15 According to the Department of Defense, in 1998, Padilla moved
to Egypt,16 changed his name to Abdullah al Muhajir,17 and traveled to
8
See, e.g., George C. Harris, Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of
National Security, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 135, 147-49 (Spring 2003); William Rehnquist, Civil Liberty and the Civil
War: The Indianapolis Treason Trials, 72 IND. L.J. 927, 932 (1997); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes,
Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During
Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 1-2, 9, 15-20 (January 2004); Carl Tobias, Detentions, Military
Commissions, Terrorism, And Domestic Case Precedent, 76 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1371 (Sept. 2003); David Cole, Their
Liberties, Our Security: Democracy and Double Standards, 31 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 290, 291 (Summer 2003).
9
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countries in the Middle East and Southwest Asia in 1999 and 2000.18
Allegedly, he met with senior al Queda officials and discussed plans to
detonate a radioactive bomb in the United States.19
After his arrest, Padilla was held as a civilian material witness20 in the
Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York.21 In June 2002, when
Padilla’s counsel moved to vacate the material witness warrant, President
Bush declared that Padilla was an “enemy combatant” and ordered the
Secretary of Defense to take custody of him.22 The Department of Defense
transferred him to a naval brig in South Carolina and has detained him there
since, incommunicado and, until recently,23 without access to counsel.24
In the fall of 2001, the Northern Alliance25 captured Yaser Esam
Hamdi in Afghanistan and turned him over to the United States military along
with other prisoners.26 When the U.S. military discovered that Hamdi was a
U.S. citizen, they transferred him from a detention camp in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba to the Norfolk Naval Station Brig in Virginia.27
Unlike Padilla, Hamdi did not grow up in the United States. He was
born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana but his family left the United States for Saudi
Arabia when he was a young child.28 In contrast to the searching media
inquiry into Padilla’s U.S. childhood,29 neither the media nor the courts have
shed much light on Hamdi’s background. According to the petition his father
filed on his behalf, Hamdi was residing in Afghanistan when Northern
Alliance forces detained him.30 The Department of Defense alleges that he
served with the Taliban and had an assault rifle when he was captured.31 Like
special advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (hereinafter “Mobbs Declaration”)). Mobbs claimed to
have no direct knowledge of Padilla’s actions or of the interrogations that produced the information in the
declaration. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 700.
18
Padilla, 352 F.3d at 700-01 (citing the Mobbs Declaration).
19
Id. at 701; see also Risen & Shenon, supra note __.
20
The government may detain as a material witness an individual who has unique information about a crime
and when necessary to ensure the person’s appearance and testimony at relevant court proceedings. 18 U.S.C. §
3144 (2000); see Stacey M. Studnicki & John P. Apol, Witness Detention and Intimidation: The History and Future
of Material Witness Law, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 483, 485 (Summer 2002).
21
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F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Hamdi II”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (“Hamdi III”), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981
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Padilla, President Bush has classified Hamdi as an “enemy combatant.”32
Like Padilla, the Department of Defense has detained Hamdi in a military brig
incommunicado and, until recently, without access to legal counsel.33 The
United States has brought no charges against either detainee.34
On January 8, 2003, the Fourth Circuit upheld the military’s detention
of Hamdi, ruling that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments did not require the
government to provide him a criminal trial.35 Portraying him as a foreigner
who “may not have renounced his American citizenship,”36 the opinion
described Hamdi’s U.S. citizenship as accidentally obtained and characterized
his connection with the U.S. community as minimal at best.37 Consistent with
that portrayal, the opinion relied upon rules that govern the scope of
constitutional protections for non-citizens.38 It applied the plenary power
doctrine, which calls for extraordinary judicial deference to the executive and
legislative branches and diminished constitutional protections when those
branches act in the spheres of immigration, national security, or foreign
policy.39 The plenary power doctrine was created in part to govern those
deemed outside the social contract embodied in the Constitution, such as noncitizens.40 Hamdi was the first time that a court had applied the plenary power
doctrine to a U.S. citizen in the United States alleged to be an unlawful
combatant.
On December 18, 2003, the Second Circuit ruled that, because Padilla
was an “American citizen” seized on “American soil,” the military could not
constitutionally detain him and he was entitled to the constitutional protections
of a criminal trial.41 It declined to apply to Padilla standards developed to
govern non-citizens in indefinite detention, instead emphasizing his
citizenship and the constitutional protections that limited the President’s
power to detain citizens.42 It rejected the application of the plenary power
32

Id.
Id. at 460-61.
34
Id. at 460; Padilla,352 F.3d at 700.
35
Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 470-71.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 460 (stating “Hamdi apparently was born in Louisiana but left for Saudi Arabia when he was a small
child”).
38
Id. at 474 (citing, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001)); see infra, notes 247-56 and accompanying text.
39
See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (articulating the elements of the
plenary power doctrine). Curtiss-Wright excluded citizens from the scope of its holding: “Neither the Constitution
nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens….”).
Id.; see also David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003,
1015-26 (Summer 2002) [hereinafter “In Aid of Removal”] (describing the Supreme Court’s deference to the plenary
power of the federal government when it creates “substantive criteria” to govern the admission and expulsion of
aliens, and noting that plenary power is limited only by due process considerations).
40
See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth
Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5 (November 2002); Natsu Taylor Saito,
Asserting Plenary Power over the “Other”: Indians, Immigrants, Colonial Subjects, and Why U.S. Jurisprudence
Needs to Incorporate International Law, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 427, 429-30 (2002) [hereinafter “Asserting
Plenary Power”].
41
Padilla, 352 F.3d at 699.
42
Id. at 711-24; see also id. at 733 (Wesley, J., dissenting) (citing as precedent for the legality of Padilla’s
33
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doctrine to Padilla, holding that the President had overstepped his powers in
indefinitely detaining this citizen.43
What distinguishes these two detainees? Both are citizens. Both have
been declared to be unlawful combatants. Both are detained in military
custody in the United States. Yet the two cases reach opposite conclusions.
Although the opinions seek to distinguish one another based on whether the
seizure took place inside or outside the United States, away from a zone of
combat,44 both citizens have been detained within the United States and within
reach of a functioning civil court. Can we attribute the outcomes entirely to a
liberty-oriented Second Circuit versus a security-minded Fourth Circuit?
Assuming the government’s allegations are true, the harm to the
United States that Padilla would cause by detonating a radioactive bomb in the
United States is arguably greater than the harm to the United States that
Hamdi caused fighting the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Shouldn’t the
executive branch have greater latitude to protect the country against disloyal
citizens when the threat is within our borders? Does the characterization of
Hamdi as effectively a foreigner and Padilla as the archetypal U.S. citizen
suggest a more compelling explanation for the different outcomes in these two
opinions? What is the significance of the reliance in Hamdi and not Padilla
on rules traditionally applied to non-citizens and of the use of the plenary
power doctrine? Scholarship concerning the enemy combatant cases has
generally overlooked the appearance of the plenary power doctrine and,
associated with it, the reliance on rules governing non-citizens to measure the
scope of constitutional protections for citizens. Although many observers
have commented on the differences in the treatment of citizens and noncitizens alleged to be belligerents, little attention has been paid whether these
cases actually maintain a firm line between citizenship and alienage.45
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in both Hamdi and Padilla
and will hear the cases in the upcoming term.46 As the Court grapples with the
tension between national security and individual rights that both Hamdi and
Padilla raise, its decision cannot fail to affect traditional conceptions of equal
citizenship. In doing so, the Supreme Court is likely to consider two central
precedents about the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens detained as enemy
combatants, Ex Parte Milligan47 and Ex Parte Quirin.48 All four cases
detention Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (establishing standards for detention of non-citizens)).
43
Id. at 711-24.
44
Id. at 711; Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 465.
45
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and We The People After September 11, 66 ALB. L. REV. 413, 422 (2003)
(“What is really troubling about the government's response to September 11 has not been that the government is
treating citizens and non-citizens differently. Rather, it is that current policies treat many citizens as if they were
non-citizens—at least if we look beyond a narrow, legalistic definition of what it means to be a U.S. citizen”); Neal
K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259,
1296 (2002) (arguing that protecting the rights of non-citizens requires linking them with the rights of citizens).
46
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, --- S. Ct. --- , 2004 WL 95802, *1 (2004).
47
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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consider the habeas petitions of U.S. citizens that invoke constitutional
protections against military detention or trial. Like Padilla, Milligan rejected
the government’s assertion of plenary power to assert military jurisdiction
over citizens, holding that the citizen possesses individual constitutional rights
that constrain the exercise of federal power.49 Like Hamdi, Quirin rejected the
petitioner’s citizenship-based claim to constitutional protections under the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments and relied on rules and principles from cases
involving non-citizens.50 Elements of the plenary power doctrine appear in
Quirin, including judicial deference to the government’s claim that it has
inherent power to try a citizen in a military forum where individual
constitutional rights do not apply.51
In this article, I propose that the unlawful combatant cases have erased
the divide between citizens and non-citizens and created a hybrid category of
citizenship. I seek to explain why rules that govern the scope of federal power
over non-citizens, such as the plenary power doctrine, have begun to appear in
decisions about federal power over citizens. I suggest that underlying the
courts’ decisions throughout the unlawful combatant cases are determinations
about the legitimacy of the individual petitioner’s citizenship. The emergence
of the plenary power doctrine in these cases reflects the application of a sub
rosa membership test for true citizenship that evaluates whether a citizen is
entitled to the full benefits of individual constitutional rights.52 This
membership test not only measures the strength of the individual’s connection
to the United States, but also evaluates the community with which the court
associates the individual and the legitimacy of that community’s claim to
participation in theconstitutional social contract.
Whether a citizen suspected of being an “enemy combatant” is truly a
member of the national community predetermines the ultimate decision about
whether the citizen is entitled to the constitutional protections of a criminal
trial rather than a military forum. Those viewed as having insufficient ties to
the United States community become, in effect, pseudo -citizens who receive a
lower level of constitutional protection than full citizens. Pseudo-citizens are
subject to the plenary power doctrine, which permits law governing noncitizens to apply. This focus on the quality or nature of the individual’s
citizenship is consistent with the use of the plenary power doctrine, which
grew out of contexts in which citizenship was either suspect or absent.
Part I of this article describes the development of the pseudo-citizen in
the Supreme Court case law starting with Milligan in 1866 and leading up to
48

317 U.S. 1 (1942).
Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121-22.
50
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38, 44.
51
Id. at 29-46.
52
See Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 456-88 (2000)
[hereinafter “Citizenship”] (describing four discourses in case law regarding citizenship: formal legal status, rights,
political activity, and identity).
49
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the current enemy combatant cases. In the century after Milligan, the plenary
power doctrine emerged through the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
concerning groups considered outside of the national membership: Asian
immigrants and Native Americans.53 Finally, this section explores how, in
Quirin, the petitioner’s failure to meet the citizenship test coincided with the
Court’s early application of elements of the plenary power doctrine to citizens
accused of being enemy combatants. I propose that, in these cases, the
doctrine contributed to the creation of a category of pseudo-citizens.
Part II argues that this membership test plays out in opposite ways in
Hamdi and Padilla. It explores the application of the plenary power doctrine
in Hamdi to citizens accused of being enemy combatants,54 and the tension in
Padilla concerning the doctrine.55 Part III addresses the implications of a
membership test that creates a new category of citizenship. It discusses the
possible outcome of the upcoming Supreme Court decisions in Hamdi and
Padilla and confronts the larger effects on both citizens and non-citizens of
the malleability of citizenship categories. I observe that a hierarchy of
citizenship in which some citizens receive greater constitutional protections
than others upsets common understandings about equality across citizens. A
membership test for citizenship is likely to disproportionately impact those
citizens who are perceived as being on the margins of citizenship. It also
unmoors expectations about the stability and permanency of citizenship by
allowing the government, rather than the citizen, to control citizenship status.
Finally, I conclude that the use of rules governing non-citizens instructs us to
be cautious when fashioning rules for non-citizens because those rules may
eventually be applied to citizens.
I.

CITIZENSHIP, MEMBERSHIP AND THE RISE OF THE PLENARY POWER
DOCTRINE

In the decades between the Court’s Ex Parte Milligan and Ex Parte
Quirin decisions, the Court laid the groundwork for a membership test to
determine whether a citizen accused of aiding the enemy was subject to a
military trial rather than the constitutional protection of a criminal trial.
Throughout this period, the Court applied membership and social contract
principles, which focus on “the consent of a particular population to be
governed”56 and identify who is entitled by that consent to the protections of
the Constitution.57
53

See Cleveland, supra note __, at 7; Saito, Asserting Plenary Power, supra note __, at 429.
Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 281; Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 474.
55
Padilla, 352 F.3d at 713-14; see also id. at 726 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
56
Cleveland, supra note __, at 20.
57
Scholars of immigration jurisprudence have explored the tension between social contract/membership theory
and a more inclusive view of constitutional protection based on personhood. They seek to explain the tension in the
54
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Who is entitled to constitutional guarantees is not obvious from the
text of the Constitution.58 Although the Constitution begins with the phrase
“We the People,” it does not define who those “people” are.59 Few provisions
of the Constitution specify that they apply to citizens only.60 Most provisions,
particularly the Bill of Rights, either address “the people” or “persons”61 or
couch their application in more general terms.62 The acquisition of citizenship
appears once in the body of the Constitution, empowering Congress to enact
“an uniform Rule of Naturalization.”63
Social contract theory, also called membership theory,64 has attempted
to answer the question of who “the People” are.
The social
contract/membership approach begins with the premise that “members of the
citizenry have agreed to be governed in a particular manner.”65 McCulloch v.
Maryland took this approach in its description of the constitutional bargain
struck between the people and their government: “The government proceeds
directly from the people . . . . Its powers are granted by them, and are to be
exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.”66 From that contractual
premise, the membership approach concludes that “[o]nly members and
Supreme Court’s alienage jurisprudence between extreme deference to the political branches of government under
the plenary power doctrine and heightened suspicion of invidious governmental action. See Michael J. Wishnie,
Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 493, 523 (May 2001) (explaining that membership theory in alienage scholarship is a “tension between ‘plenary
power’ principles and the imperative of national borders on the one hand, and equality principles at stake in
government regulation of all persons within its borders on the other”). See also Michael Scaperlanda, Partial
Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707, 712 (March 1996); Cleveland, supra
note __, at 19-25 (providing a comprehensive history of membership theory, its connection to social contract theory,
and the flexibility and indeterminacy of the theories).
58
Cleveland, supra note __, at 20-25 (describing various approaches in the nineteenth century to this question);
see also Rogers M. Smith, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 36-37 (1998);
Gerald L. Neuman, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 5
(1996).
59
Neuman, supra note __, at 3-4; see Cleveland, supra note __, at 17-20.
60
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (granting privileges and immunities to “Citizens of each State”); id. art. I, § 3,
cl. 3 (requiring citizenship to hold the office of senator); id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring citizenship to become a
member of Congress); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (limiting to natural born citizens the office of presidency). See also
Cleveland, supra note __, at 18. The Fourteenth Amendment, which provides for birthright citizenship, did not exist
when the Supreme Court decided Milligan. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
61
U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting “the right of the people peaceably to assemble”); id. amend. II (protecting
“the right of the people to keep and bear arms”); id.amend. IV (“the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures”); id. amend. V (“No person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,... nor shall any person... be twice put in jeopardy... nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law….”); id. amend. IX (retaining for “the people” rights other
than those enumerated); id. amend. X (reserving to the states and “the people” those powers not delegated to the
United States).
62
E.g., id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial . . . .”); id.amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted”).
63
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Arguably, Article II also addresses the acquisition of citizenship. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4
(limiting the presidency to birthright citizens). See also Saito, Asserting Plenary Power, supra note __, at 436.
64
Cleveland, supra note __, at 20-21.
65
Id. at 20; Neuman, supra note __, at 5 (noting that the Constitution’s Preamble “arguably speaks the language
of social contract”); Alexander M. Bickel, Citizen or Person? What is not Granted Cannot Be Taken Away, in THE
MORALITY OF CONSENT 33, 36 (1975).
66
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404-05 (1819).

9-Mar-04

CITIZENS OF AN ENEMY LAND

9

beneficiaries of the social contract are able to make claims against the
government.”67 Conversely, “the government may act outside of the
contract’s constraints against” non-members.68
This section explores how Ex Parte Milligan’s69 use of
membership/social contract theory laid the groundwork for the evolution of a
category of pseudo-citizens without full membership in the citizenry. The
Court’s later application of membership theory to Chinese immigrants and
Native Americans spurred the development of the plenary power doctrine and
led to the early construction of the pseudo-citizen. Quirin applied the
membership test from Milligan and aspects of the plenary power doctrine to
categorize the petitioner as a pseudo-citizen and exclude him from entitlement
to the constitutional rights of the criminal process.
A.

Ex Parte Milligan: The U.S. Citizen Insider

In Milligan, the Court granted the habeas petition of a citizen of
Indiana who the military had detained and tried during the Civil War.70
Lamdin P. Milligan was born in Ohio71 and had lived in Indiana for twenty
years before he was arrested at his home by the officer commanding the
military district of Indiana.72 Military authorities had raided the offices of
Milligan’s associate and confiscated “guns, ammunition, and incriminating
documents.”73
A military commission tried Milligan and several others on charges of
conspiring against the U.S. government, affording aid and comfort to the
rebels, inciting insurrection, disloyal practices, and committing violations of
the laws of war.74 These charges were based on allegations that in 1863 and
1864 Milligan had aided a secret society known as the Order of American
Knights or the Sons of Liberty in an attempt to overthrow the U.S.
67
Cleveland, supra note __, at 20. See also J.M. Spectar, To Ban or Not to Ban an American Taliban?
Revocation of Citizenship & Statelessness in a Statecentric System, 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 263, 271-72 (Spring 2003)
(describing citizenship theories based on consent); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84
MICH. L. REV. 1471, 1490 (1986) (describing citizenship as “membership in a state generated by mutual consent of a
person and the state”); Michael Walzer, WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE AN AMERICAN? ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE 82-95 (1996) (describing the citizen as a member of a political community who is entitled to certain
benefits from the state and who must fulfill “common expectations” pertaining to that membership).
68
Cleveland, supra note __, at 20. See also Peter H. Schuck & Rogers M. Smith, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT
CONSENT, ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 23-24 (1985).
69
Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
70
Id. at 121-22.
71
William Rehnquist, Civil Liberty and the Civil War: The Indianapolis Treason Trials, 72 IND. L.J. 927, 932
(1997). According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, Milligan was a lawyer who had become active in Democratic politics.
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Milligan, 71 U.S at 6, 122. Several others active in the Democratic Party were also arrested and charged,
including Harrison H. Dodd, a leader of the Order of American Knights, Horace Heffren, a Democrat in the Indiana
legislature, and William Bowles, in his eighties, who was a slave owner and sympathized with the South. Rehnquist,
supra note __, at 932. Dodd escaped to Canada before his military trial could conclude. Id. at 933.
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government, communicated with the enemy, and conspired to seize munitions
stored in arsenals, liberate prisoners of war, and resist the draft.75 The military
commission found him guilty, sentenced him to be hanged, and the President
approved the War Department’s order for his execution.76
A few months later, Milligan sought habeas corpus in civil court.77
The United States Circuit Court for Indiana empanelled a grand jury pursuant
to a federal statute that made habeas corpus available to citizens of states “in
which the administration of the laws in the Federal tribunals was unimpaired”
once a grand jury had convened and adjourned without indictment or
presentment.78 The grand jury considered Milligan’s case and then dispersed,
having found no violation of United States laws.79 Milligan’s habeas corpus
petition thus confronted the Supreme Court with incompatible rulings from the
civil and military courts.80
The Supreme Court decided, as a threshold matter, that it had
jurisdiction to determine whether a military commission rather than a criminal
court was the proper tribunal for Milligan.81 The Supreme Court then held
that a military commission had no jurisdiction to try a citizen who was not a
member of the military and who resided in a state loyal to the Constitution
when the civil courts, created by Congress and empowered to hear criminal
cases, were open and functioning.82 The Court rejected the government’s
argument that the Bill of Rights did not apply in wartime.83 It held that the
military trial had violated the Sixth Amendment’s requirement of a trial before
an impartial jury and the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that a grand jury
indictment precede all prosecutions of citizen civilians.84
From one perspective, questions about membership in the national
community seem to be absent in Milligan. After the Civil War, the dominant
vision of federal power was of a federal government limited to the enumerated
powers in the Constitution.85 Milligan’s holding relied upon two precepts of
the enumerated powers doctrine: that the national government’s power stems
solely from the enumerated powers of the Constitution, and that the powers
granted to the people in the Constitution limit that federal power.86 First,
Milligan confined the source of the government’s authority to the text of the
75

Milligan, 71 U.S. at 6-7.
Id. at 107-08.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 108, 116.
79
Id. at 107-08.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 118.
82
Id. at 121.
83
Rehnquist, supra note __, at 934.
84
Milligan, 71 U.S. at 118-30.
85
See id.at 119; see also McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405 (declaring “This government is acknowledged by all, to be
one of enumerated powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to it... is now universally
admitted.”); Cleveland, supra note __, at 3 (describing the earmarks of the enumerated powers doctrine).
86
Milligan, 71 U.S. at 119; McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405; U.S. CONST. amend. X.
76
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Constitution,87 rejecting arguments that law external to the Constitution such
as an “unwritten criminal code” or the “laws and usages of war,” could trump
constitutional provisions.88 Second, the constitutional powers of the states and
the people prohibited the federal government from suspending civil rights and
subjecting citizens to military command.89 The founders had “secured in a
written constitution every right which the people had wrested from power
during a contest of ages” and neither the President, nor Congress, nor the
judiciary could disturb those rights.90
In the end, Milligan reveals a deep conflict about who “the People” are
who wield the constitutional power that constrains the government. While
Milligan seems to extend constitutional protections to “all classes of men, at
all times, and under all circumstances,”91 a closer reading of the opinion
suggests a more limited membership in the constitutional community.
Throughout the opinion, the Supreme Court invokes citizenship as a central
source of constitutional rights and characterizes it as a status imbued with
constitutional guarantees against government action. 92
Milligan’s citizenship is the first piece of information that the Court
imparts, emphasizing that “Milligan is a citizen of the United States” and “has
lived for twenty years in Indiana.”93 The opinion frames the “controlling
question” of the case in terms of citizenship. Inquiring whether the military
had jurisdiction to try and sentence Milligan, the opinion begins its response
by observing that “Milligan, not a resident of one of the rebellious states, but a
citizen of Indiana for twenty years past, and never in the military or naval
service, is, while at his home” arrested by the military, imprisoned, convicted,
and sentenced to be hanged.94
Citizenship defines the rights at play in this case for the Court, evoking
the constitutional protections of a criminal trial. In discussing the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus, the Court noted that the writ had “never before

87
Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121-22. The military commission could not be “justif[ied] on the mandate of the
President; because he is controlled by law, and has his appropriate sphere of duty, which is to execute, not to make,
the laws . . . .” Id. at 121. Nor could Congress grant such power to a military commission. Id.
88
Id. at 121.
89
Id. at 124.
90
Id. at 119, 125.
91
Id. at 120. The Court emphasized that the principles of the Constitution do not yield even in “troublous times
… when rulers and people would become restive under restraint, and seek by sharp and decisive measures to
accomplish ends deemed just and proper ….” Id. at 120. This proclamation of the breadth of the Constitution’s
protections and the universal population to which they extend flows from a vision of the Constitution as the central
source of law for all people, not just citizens.
92
E.g., id. at 115 (“[t]he privilege of this great writ had never before been withheld from the citizen”), 119 (“it
is the birthright of every American citizen when charged with a crime, to be tried and punished according to law”),
121 (“the ‘laws and usages of war’ . . . can never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of
the government, and where the courts are open and their process unobstructed”); see also id. at 121-22, 123, 125,
126.
93
Id. at 107.
94
Id. at 118.
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been withheld from the citizen.”95 The Court stated that “it is the birthright of
every American citizen when charged with a crime, to be tried and punished
according to law.”96 That “birthright” entitles the American citizen to the
protections of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.97 Other than those
serving in the military, “citizens of states where the courts are open, if charged
with crime, are guaranteed the inestimable privilege of trial by jury.”98
Military trials of civilian citizens were impermissible because “a trial by an
established court, assisted by an impartial jury, was the only sure way of
protecting the citizen against oppression and wrong.”99
In this way, Milligan addresses the question of what identifies “the
People” whose powers limit the government’s actions. The Court’s answer is
that citizens — at least those who reside in loyal states — belong to the class
of “people” who may invoke the Constitution’s protections.100 The Court
positions Milligan the Citizen as an insider, as a member of the constitutional
community deserving of constitutional protections, despite allegations and
evidence that he aided the enemy.
Is this emphasis on citizenship merely rhetorical? The Court’s focus
on the significance of citizenship to constitutional protections appears to
motivate the result in this case. Certain facts — that he is a citizen, has been a
longstanding resident of Indiana, and has never lived in the rebellious states
— surface again and again in the opinion.101 This refrain emphasizes
Milligan’s identity with the community of citizens of Indiana and the United
States.102 It assumes a significance in the opinion that transcends mere
rhetorical support for the Court’s holding. His citizenship is defined less by
the one-dimensional nature of his formal citizenship status than by the depth
and quality of his connection to the United States.103 Milligan’s citizenship,
95

Id. at 115.
Id. at 119.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 123.
99
Id. at 126.
100
See Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1575, 1592 (June 2002) (positing
citizenship as a form of inclusion, in which citizens “imagine fellow members who are to be included in a network of
kinship or membership”).
101
Id. at 107 (“The case made by the petition is this: Milligan is a citizen of the United States; has lived for
twenty years in Indiana; and, at the time of the grievances complained of, was not, and never had been in the military
or naval service of the United States”), 108 (“Milligan insists that said military commission had no jurisdiction to try
him . . . because he was a citizen of the United States and the State of Indiana, and had not been, since the
commencement of the late Rebellion, a resident of any of the States whose citizens were arrayed against the
government”), 118 (“Milligan, not a resident of one of the rebellious states, or a prisoner of war, but a citizen of
Indiana for twenty years past, and never in the military or naval service, is, while at his home, arrested by the military
power of the United States”), 131 (“It is not easy to see how he can be treated as a prisoner of war, when he lived in
Indiana for the past twenty years, was arrested there, and had not been, during the late troubles, a resident of any of
the states in rebellion”).
102
See Volpp supra, note __ at 1593 (focusing on the role of ideology in “either including one as a citizen or
excluding one from membership”).
103
See Peter H. Schuck, Citizenship in Federal Systems, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 207-08 (Spring 2000)
(comparing the “legal” dimension of citizenship, which “emphasizes the positive law that creates the distinctive
status of citizen,” with the “psychological” dimension which measures an individual’s identification with a particular
96
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the length of his residence in Indiana, and his connection to that state form a
sort of “minimum contacts” test104 that measures the strength of the
connection between the citizen and the citizenry.
Yet, applying a social contract-membership approach could lead to the
opposite conclusion from the one the Court reached. Milligan arguably
breached the social contract through his alleged conduct.105 In the midst of a
war over the very survival of the social contract, why not permit a military
commission to decide whether Milligan remained a party to that contract?
The answer may lie in Milligan’s dual vision of the social contract that
underlies the Constitution. The social contract between the government and
its people includes, on one level, individual citizens. On a second level, in
Milligan, “the people” are composed of the people of the state or the nation as
a whole. The Court examines the effect of military jurisdiction on both levels.
In addition to addressing whether the Constitution endowed Milligan with
enforceable rights as an individual member of the social contract, the Court
also focused on the people of Indiana and the United States. This second view
of membership hearkens back to the social contract theory in McCulloch v.
Maryland.106 McCulloch described the bargain as struck primarily between
the people of their states and the national government, and secondarily
requiring the “assent of the states” themselves.107 This agreement was entered
into by delegates “chosen in each state by the people” of that state.108 In this
view, the people of the states as a whole compose the membership of the
community that entered into the social contract.
This collective bargain manifests itself in two ways in Milligan. First,
the opinion characterizes the government’s use of a military commission
instead of a criminal court as flouting the instruction of the people’s national
representatives. Congress had created a statutory process to determine the
loyalty of citizens like Milligan who had been detained by the military.109 It
“declared penalties against the offences charged, provided for their
punishment, and directed [the Circuit Court of Indiana] to hear and determine
them.”110 In effect, the legislature had defined a protected category of citizens
who were within the circle of membership. The military trial evaded these
instructions.
Second, the opinion turned to the people of Indiana. The loyalty of the
state, and with the “sociological dimension” of citizenship which “looks to how individual citizens are integrated into
civil society”).
104
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (establishing a “minimum contacts” test for
personal jurisdiction).
105
Milligan was charged with insurrection, conspiring against the government, communicating with and aiding
the enemy, conspiring to seize weapons and liberate prisoners of war. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 6-7, 122.
106
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
107
Id. at 403.
108
Id.
109
Milligan, 71 U.S. at 115-16, 122.
110
Id. at 122.
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state of Indiana and its people marked them as members of the constitutional
community and affirmed their accord with the constitutional contract. The
proceeding in the Indiana Circuit Court “was held in a state, eminently
distinguished for its patriotism, by judges commissioned during the
Rebellion.”111 Its people composed the jury, “upright, intelligent, and selected
by a marshal appointed by the President,” that participated in providing
Milligan the constitutional right to trial by jury.112 The community of citizens
of Indiana who composed the grand jury found no criminal violation,113
indicating that they, as a jury of Milligan’s peers, had seen no reason to
exclude him from their group. Thus, the use of the military commission
upstaged and demeaned the authority provided under the Constitution to the
states and the people. It violated the bargain embodied in the Constitution
between “the people” of the state of Indiana and the government they and
others had created.
The outcome of the case directly relates to the connection between
Milligan’s citizenship and the community of citizens of Indiana. The issue of
whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments applied related to his status as a
member of the citizenry of Indiana. The Court rejected the application of the
“laws and usages of war” to citizens “in states which have upheld the authority
of the government.”114 Milligan’s connection to Indiana permits that state’s
loyalty to act as a proxy for Milligan’s, nullifying his alleged disloyalty. As a
citizen of a loyal state, regardless of his own beliefs or actions, the benefits of
membership apply to guarantee him a criminal trial. By affirmatively
considering the loyalty of the state of Indiana and the value of the participation
of its people in the criminal process, the Court elevated to constitutional
magnitude the harm that trial by military commission might do to this second
level of the social contract.
On the strength of this social contract analysis, the government’s
accusations of treason and insurrection did not cause the Court to exclude
Milligan as an outsider. He is never characterized as a member of the enemy
forces. The anti-governmental actions of which he is accused scarcely make
an appearance in the opinion, and then only after its central holdings.115 Even
when the Court suggests that those who conspire against the government in
wartime are “dangerous enemies,”116 their alleged actions are “crimes” and the
111

Id.
Id.
113
Id. at 107-08, 122.
114
Id. at 121.
115
Id. at 107, 122 (referring to the accusations merely as “certain charges and specifications”). Even then, they
are almost an afterthought, an opportunity for the Court to condemn the alleged conduct without attaching to it any
significance that would impact the outcome of the case. The Court stated: “[A]lthough Milligan's trial and conviction
by a military commission was illegal, yet, if guilty of the crimes imputed to him, and his guilt had been ascertained
by an established court and impartial jury, he deserved severe punishment.” Id. at 130 (emphasis in original).
116
Id. at 130 (stating “Open resistance to the measures deemed necessary to subdue a great rebellion . . .
becomes an enormous crime when it assumes the form of a secret political organization, armed to oppose the laws,
112
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“enemies” are subject to criminal law, not a military trial.117
Milligan is usually interpreted as a case about the scope of
constitutional protections for citizens during wartime.118 Its holding could
have been limited to the unique context of the Civil War, and the emphasis on
citizenship explained by the need to promote unity among a divided people
just after the war ended. Yet the case takes up more interpretive space than
that. It employed the enumerated powers doctrine to constrain the federal
government and constitutionally empower Milligan and the citizens of
Indiana. It enlivened notions of social contract and membership to centralize
citizenship within the constitutional inquiry. And it defined the guideposts for
identifying those citizens that belonged within the membership: indicia of
association with a state or community considered a party to the social contract,
and the potential for harm to that community’s stake in the social contract.
These guideposts find application beyond the Civil War in later cases
addressing citizens and foreign wars.
B.

Plenary Power and the Pseudo-Citizen

Nearly a century passed between Milligan and Ex Parte Quirin, the
next time the Court confronted the extent of federal power over citizens
accused as enemy combatants. During this century, the plenary power
doctrine emerged through case law that excluded particular groups – primarily
Native Americans and Asian immigrants – from membership in the
constitutional community.119 Citizenship, or the lack of it, was a central
feature of the Court’s move towards expansive federal power and away from a
national government limited by the constitutional division of power between
the federal government, the states, and the people. The Court’s use of
membership theory in formulating the plenary power doctrine led to the
construction of a pseudo-citizenship subject to greater federal power and
fewer constitutional protections.120
This section will first sketch the outlines of the modern plenary power
doctrine as it appeared in United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp.121
and seeks by stealthy means to introduce the enemies of the country into peaceful communities, there to light the
torch of civil war, and thus overthrow the power of the United States.”)
117
Id. (“[T]hose concerned in [such conspiracies] are dangerous enemies to their country, and should receive
the heaviest penalties of law, as an example to deter others from similar criminal conduct.”).
118
See e.g., Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 314 (1946); Rehnquist, supra note __, at 130, 137.
119
See id. at 25-158; Saito, Asserting Plenary Power, supra note __, at 434-43; T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 11-36 (2002)
[hereinafter “SEMBLANCES”]. These scholars have also explored a third context: the territories. See Cleveland,
supra note __, at 163-250; Saito, Asserting Plenary Power, supra note __, at 443-47, 455-58. I do not focus on the
territories in this article.
120
Criticism of the plenary power doctrine has been legion. See, e.g., Wishnie, supra note __, at 503 & n.51
(noting “The plenary power doctrine has suffered withering criticism as a shameful and racist relic”) (collecting
citations).
121
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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Second, it will examine how membership theory influenced the plenary power
doctrine’s application to the constitutional rights of non-citizens: immigrants
seeking to enter or remain in the United States and Native Americans before
their naturalization by statute.122 Third, it will explore the Court’s decisions
about whether the plenary power doctrine continued to apply when Native
Americans and immigrants subsequently became citizens.
1.

Curtiss-Wright and the Plenary Power Doctrine

The plenary power doctrine emerged in its modern form in the
Supreme Court’s 1936 decision in Curtiss-Wright,123 over 60 years after
Milligan. The case arose from allegations that the Curtiss-Wright Export
Corporation sold arms to Bolivia in violation of a presidential proclamation
that prohibited such sales.124 The Supreme Court upheld the proclamation
against the challenge that it was an invalid delegation of legislative power to
the executive.125
Curtiss-Wright articulated three characteristics of the plenary power
doctrine:126 reliance on a source of federal power that originated outside of the
text of the Constitution,127 the absence of substantive constitutional limits on
that power,128 and judicial deference to executive or legislative decisions that
extend from that power.129 It also took two steps that would later influence
the treatment of U.S. citizens detained as enemy combatants.
First, Curtiss-Wright took a great step away from Milligan’s reliance
on the enumerated powers of the Constitution as the source of federal power
and a constraint upon that power. Instead, it confined the enumerated powers
doctrine to “internal affairs,”130 excluding it from contexts that involve
sovereignty or nationality.131
122
Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, § 6, 34 Stat. 182, 183 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1994)); see also
Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887 § 6, 24 Stat. 388 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341342, 348- 349, 354, 381 (1994)).
123
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318-22.
124
Id. at 311. The proclamation was made pursuant to a joint resolution of Congress. Id.
125
Id. at 333.
126
Id. at 318-22; see Cleveland, supra note __, at 5 (delineating the three characteristics).
127
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318-19 (declaring that “the investment of the federal government with the
powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution” and, consistent with
international law, the President was the “sole organ of the nation in its external relations”). Federal authority over
foreign affairs was inherent in the United States’ status as an independent sovereign. Id.
128
Id. (rejecting claims of constitutional restraint on federal power in the acquisition of territory, expulsion of
aliens, and the making of international agreements, and declaring that “[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed
in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory”).
129
Id. at 322 (cautioning that the Court “should not be in haste” to craft judicial rules about federal power in
foreign relations and warning courts to “hesitate long before limiting or embarrassing” the “sovereignty” and
“powers of nationality” of the federal government) (quoting Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915)).
130
Id. at 315-16 (rejecting the “broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers except
those specifically enumerated in the Constitution”).
131
See id at 322. The federal powers to “acquire territory by discovery and occupation,” to “expel undesirable
aliens” and to make “such international agreements as do not constitute treaties in the constitutional sense” were
“inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality” despite not being “expressly affirmed by the
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Second, Curtiss-Wright carefully divorced its holding from U.S.
citizens. It declared that “[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed in
pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own
citizens.”132 Thus, citizens appeared to remain firmly within constitutional
boundaries and outside of the reach of the plenary power doctrine.
Although Curtiss-Wright is acclaimed as the first full articulation of
the plenary power doctrine, its beginnings have been traced to the 19th century,
shortly after the decision in Milligan.133 Despite Curtiss- Wright’s exempting
citizens from its holding, the history of the doctrine reveals that citizens who
were perceived as less than full members of the citizenry could, in fact, be
subject to the plenary power doctrine. It is this history that opened the way to
the doctrine’s application in the current enemy combatant cases.
2.

The Early Development of the Plenary Power Doctrine: Non-Citizens

In the early 1800s, prior to Milligan, both Native Americans and
Chinese immigrants were considered citizens of foreign states, and Congress
barred them from becoming naturalized U.S. citizens.134 The enumerated
powers doctrine also limited the federal government’s power over Native
Americans to the constitutional provisions that expressly addressed them.135
Beginning two decades after Milligan, the Court reversed its reliance on the
enumerated powers doctrine and invoked membership principles to justify
expanding federal power over both Native Americans and immigrants. In
separate decisions, the Court described both communities as aberrant states,
existing within but apart from the nation.
In United States v. Kagama, the Court held that Congress had authority
to legislate a criminal code for Native Americans.136 The Court based its
decision in part on a view of Native Americans that excluded them as a
community from equal membership in the polity. As dependents of the
federal government, the tribes were fully within the “exclusive sovereignty” of
the government: “The power of the General Government over these remnants
Constitution.” Id. at 318.
132
Id. (emphasis added).
133
See Cleveland, supra note __, at 25-158; Saito, Asserting Plenary Power, supra note __, at 434-43;
Aleinikoff, SEMBLANCES, supra note __, at 11-36.
134
See Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 28 (1882), repealed by Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, § 1, 57
Stat. 600 (1943); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 19-20 (1831) (holding that under Article III, the
Court had no jurisdiction over Native American tribes as “foreign states”); see Naturalization Act of 1790, 1 Stat.
103 (1790) (limiting naturalization to “free white persons”), repealed by 70A Stat. 644 (1956). See also Saito,
Asserting Plenary Power, supra note __, at 436 (describing legislative and judicial racial restrictions on citizenship
prior to the Fourteenth Amendment).
135
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832) (holding that the War, Treaty and Indian
Commerce clauses of the Constitution governed the relationship between Native Americans and the national
government). Worcester also rejected the argument that international law provided a source of authority in lieu of the
Constitution. Id. at 543-46.
136
118 U.S. 375, 380 (1886).
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of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to
their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell.”137
Later, the Court would describe the Native Americans as “wards of the
nation,” “in a state of pupilage,” and as such subject to federal plenary
authority.138 This child-like relationship with the federal government left no
room for conceiving of the tribes as equal parties to the constitutional contract.
Three years after Kagama, in Chae Chan Ping v. United States,139 the
Court held that Congress had sovereign power to exclude Chinese resident
aliens from re-entry into the country, despite a treaty with China that had
guaranteed their reentry.140 Like Kagama, Chae Chan Ping relied heavily on
membership and social contract theory to deny constitutional protections to
Chinese residents. In rebutting the argument that resident aliens were
“persons” entitled to the panoply of constitutional rights, the Court described
the Chinese as a race inherently separate from the members of the national
community, “a Chinese settlement within the state, without any interest in our
country or its institutions.”141 Instead, “they remained strangers in the land,
residing apart by themselves, and adhering to the customs and usages of their
own country. It seemed impossible for them to assimilate with our people, or
to make any change in their habits or modes of living.”142
This refusal to assimilate constituted a breach of the social contract.
Because the Chinese “retained the habits and customs of their own
country,”143 they set themselves apart from “our people,” the primary parties
to the social contract. As a result, Chinese immigrants had no claim to the
constitutional protections that were the benefit of the constitutional bargain.144
137

Id. at 384.
Stephens, 174 U.S. at 484. Plenary power drawn from sovereignty undergirded federal authority to lease
tribal lands without tribal consent, see Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 307-08 (1902), determine the
citizenship of tribes, abolish tribal laws and courts, legislate the division of tribal lands, and subject the tribes to the
jurisdiction of the United States, see Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 478, 486-92 (1899) (rejecting Fifth
Amendment takings challenge). This power brooked no interference from judicial consideration of individual
constitutional rights: “Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from
the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial
department of the government.” Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (rejecting Fifth Amendment due
process and takings claims).
139
130 U.S. 581 (1889).
140
Id. at 589. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the Constitution did not empower Congress to expel
permanent residents and that the due process clause protected them from arbitrary expulsion. Id. at 589-90, 609;
Cleveland, supra note __, at 124-26 & n.874 (citing Briefs for Appellant by Attorneys Houndly and Carter at 30, 62).
Instead, it turned to sources of sovereign power outside any specific constitutional provision, locating adequate
federal authority in international principles governing national territory, and sovereign concerns for self-preservation
and security. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603-04, 606; see also Saito, Asserting Plenary Power, supra note __, at
435. The decision did not address Chae Chan Ping’s constitutional due process arguments. See Saito, Asserting
Plenary Power, supra note ___, at 435; Cleveland, supra note __, at 131.
141
Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 595-96.
142
Id. at 595.
143
Id.
144
Later decisions relied on membership/social contract theory to expand the notion that powers inherent in
sovereignty rather than constitutional grants of authority were the source of federal control over Native Americans
and immigrants. Upholding immigration statutes excluding individuals deemed likely to become a public charge, the
Court declared that under international law, “every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and
138
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The Court’s decisions hearken back to the second level of the social
contract from Milligan that looked to whether the group to which the
individual belonged was part of the “people” of the constitutional community.
These aberrational communities contrast markedly with Milligan’s staunchly
loyal and civic-minded state of Indiana. Unworthy of the constitutional
contract to which the citizenry of Indiana was a party in Milligan, the Native
American tribes and Chinese communities were incapable of employing that
contract to imbue their Native American and immigrant members with
constitutional protection.
3.

The Acquisition of Citizenship and the Plenary Power Doctrine

The beginning of the twentieth century brought two major expansions
in U.S. citizenship: the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment granting
citizenship to those born in the United States145 and Congress’s naturalization
of the Native American tribes.146 The question arose whether this new
enfranchisement affected the government’s plenary power over the Native
Americans and children of Chinese residents.
In United States v. Wong Kim Ark, the Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s grant of birthright citizenship included the offspring of Chinese
immigrants.147 The specter that birthright citizenship would confer full
constitutional rights on this aberrant group and that the government would
lose its plenary power to exclude them engendered stormy debate among the
justices.148 In a strident dissent, Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Harlan argued
that Congress had the power to bar “all persons of a particular race, or their
children,” from citizenship.149 Nevertheless, the majority held that the plenary
power of the government to expel Chinese aliens from the country did not
trump the Fourteenth Amendment’s grant of citizenship to all those born
essential to self-preservation,” to exclude foreigners. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659(1892) ; see
also id. at 660 (rejecting arguments that constitutional due process protected all “persons” within U.S. jurisdiction,
reasoning that the decisions of the President and Congress constituted sufficient due process of law for entering
aliens without a claim to membership). The following year, the Court declared that the “right to exclude or to expel
all aliens,” including permanent residents, was “an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent
nation.” Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893). This expansion of inherent federal power over
immigrants was concentrated in decisions about immigrants who sought to enter or remain in national territory. E.g.,
Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581; Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659. Inherent federal power encountered greater judicial resistance
when applied to aliens within the United States who were not seeking entry or fighting deportation. E.g., Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (striking down San Francisco ordinance that discriminated on the basis of
alienage as a violation of the Equal Protection clause).
145
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
146
Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, § 6, 34 Stat. 182, 183 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1994)); see also
Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887 § 6, 24 Stat. 388 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341342, 348- 349, 354, 381 (1994)).
147
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 684 (1898).
148
Id. at 705-06, 726 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the majority’s ruling would exempt the nativeborn children from the plenary power that permitted the government to deport their parents).
149
Id. at 732 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
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within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.150
This unity between citizenship and constitutional immunity from
federal plenary power disintegrated when Native American tribes obtained
U.S. citizenship.151 In a series of decisions, the Court held that federal plenary
power over Native Americans was consistent with their acquisition of
citizenship.152 In Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, despite legislation granting
citizenship to the Cherokee tribe, the Court denied the Cherokees’ Fifth
Amendment due process and takings claims.153 Although Congress had
invested the tribes with citizenship, the Court held that Congress retained
plenary control over the administration of tribal property and that the judiciary
must defer to that power.154 The takings question, therefore, was “not one for
the courts.”155
Here too, the second level of the social contract influenced the Court’s
decision about whether the Native American citizen could invoke
constitutional rights. Unlike the people of the loyal states in Milligan, the
tribes were “a state, or separate community,”156 apart from the national
community and unable to imbue their members with the benefits of the social
contract. The inability of the tribes as a community to enter into this second
level of the social contract stemmed from their race. Conferring citizenship
did not change the race of the Native Americans, who remained dependent on
the federal government157 and were not entitled to the “privileges and
immunities” associated with U.S. citizenship.158 Despite the tribes’ claim to
citizenship, they were “nevertheless Indians in race, customs, and domestic
government,” and like other Native American communities, required “special
consideration and protection”159 by the United States “as a superior and
150
Id. at 699-701. It rejected the contention that legislation and a treaty with China prohibiting the
naturalization of Chinese aliens overrode the constitutional provision of birthright citizenship. Id. at 701-04. See
also Cleveland, supra note __, at 155 (characterizing the decision as rejecting the notion that Congress had
“legislated to make the Chinese a politically subordinated racial caste — an ‘internal colony’ — within the United
States”) (citing Ronald Takaki, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS 99 (rev.
ed. 1998)).
151
Congress increasingly imposed citizenship on the tribes as part of an effort to assimilate them. Cleveland,
supra note __, at 74 & n.516 (describing the progression of statutes and treaties that had the effect of dismantling the
tribes and bestowing citizenship on individual Native Americans). Native Americans did not obtain citizenship with
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884).
152
United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 290-91 (1909) (declaring that Congress did not intend, “by the
mere grant of citizenship, to renounce entirely its jurisdiction over the individual members of this dependent race”);
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 48 (1913) (asserting that “citizenship is not in itself an obstacle to the
exercise by Congress of its power to enact laws for the benefit and protection of tribal Indians”); United States v.
Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 598 (1916) (stating that “[c]itizenship is not incompatible with tribal existence or continued
guardianship, and so may be conferred without completely emancipating the Indians, or placing them beyond the
reach of congressional regulations adopted for their protection.”).
153
Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294,305 (1902).
154
Id. at 307, 308 (reasoning that because congressional power was “political and administrative in its nature,
the manner of its exercise is a question within the province of the legislative branch to determine”).
155
Id.
156
Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 484 (1899).
157
Celestine, 215 U.S. at 290-91
.
158
Id; see also Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 48.
159
Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 39.
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civilized nation.”160
In contrast to the state of Indiana acting as a proxy for Milligan in the
social contract, the tribes’ exclusion from the social contract acted as a proxy
for the exclusion of Native American citizens as individuals. In United States
v. Sandoval,161 the Court held that the citizenship of tribal members was not
“an obstacle to the exercise by Congress of its power to enact laws for the
benefit and protection of tribal Native Americans as a dependent people.”162
Although a few individual Native Americans may have shown themselves
ready for citizenship,163 the “degraded,” “simple, uninformed, and inferior”
nature of the tribe as a whole justified Congressional plenary power.164
4.

Plenary Power and the Pseudo-Citizen

The result of the immigrant and Native American tribe exclusions was
the creation of a type of citizenship distinct from that described in Milligan.
The citizen in Milligan possessed the constitutional clout to limit the federal
government to its enumerated powers. In contrast, in the Native American
and immigrant exclusion cases, lack of citizenship expanded the scope of
federal plenary power and limited constitutional protections. Once Native
Americans were granted citizenship, that status provided no greater footing for
constitutional rights. These cases suggest that for communities excluded from
membership, citizenship was not sufficient to stave off application of the
plenary power doctrine.
It is tempting to discard these instances as bygone relics of race-based
thinking, or pigeonhole them as relevant only to the specialized areas of
immigration and Native American jurisprudence. These cases, however,
reflect a thoroughly modern conflict between two theories of citizenship. The
first, a “formal or nominal membership in an organized political
community”165 is exemplified by the Fourteenth Amendment’s grant of
birthright citizenship to native-born Chinese or the statutory citizenship of the
Native Americans. The second is citizenship as identity or solidarity with a

160

Id. at 46; see also Cleveland, supra note __, at 75.
231 U.S. 28 (1913).
162
Id. at 48.
163
Id. at 41 (quoting a report from the federal superintendent in Albuquerque: “While a few of these Pueblo
Indians are ready for citizenship . . . a large per cent of them are unable, and not yet enough advanced along the lines
of civilization, to take upon themselves the burden of citizenship.”).
164
Id. at 39, 45; see also id. at 46 (stating “in respect of distinctly Indian communities the questions whether, to
what extent, and for what time they shall be recognized and dealt with as dependent tribes requiring the guardianship
and protection of the United States are to be determined by Congress, and not by the courts.” (quoting Tiger v.
Western Invest. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 315 (1911)).
165
Bosniak, Citizenship, supra note __, at 455; see also Spectar, supra note __, at 271-72 (applying citizenship
theory to the political and legal context of the capture and trial of John Walker Lindh). See also Kim Rubenstein &
Daniel Adler, International Citizenship; The Future of Nationality in a Globalized World, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 519, 522 (2000).
161
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nation and its members.166 Formal citizenship status highlights equality
among citizens and distinctions between citizens and non-citizens.167
Solidarity with a nation implies patriotism, evoking loyalty to country and
compatriots.168
Under these two models of citizenship, Milligan can be seen as a case
in which both formal citizenship status (of Milligan) and identity and
solidarity (of the state of Indiana) led to full citizenship for Milligan. The
Native American cases, in contrast, are the result of a divergence between the
formal legal citizenship status of the individual Native American and the
tribes’ lack of identity and solidarity with the nation and its members. As a
result, Milligan’s full citizenship entitled him to constitutional rights against
excessive federal power, while Native Americans became pseudo-citizens,
entitled to a lesser set of rights and subject to greater plenary power.169
The Court’s decisions about immigrants and Native Americans laid the
groundwork for the full articulation of the plenary power doctrine in CurtissWright, as Sarah Cleveland has described.170 Curtiss-Wright explicitly relied
on the immigrant exclusion cases to bolster inherent federal power.171 While
Curtiss-Wright suggested that U.S. citizenship was a dividing line between the
use of the plenary power doctrine and the full application of the
Constitution,172 this suggestion was to be short-lived. By 1942, Ex Parte
Quirin173 would employ aspects of the plenary power doctrine during the
Second World War to sanction the military trial of a captured soldier who
166
Bosniak, Citizenship, supra note __, at 480. It evokes “the quality of belonging – the felt aspects of
community membership.” Id. at 479 (citing Derek Heater, CITIZENSHIP: THE CIVIC IDEAL IN WORLD HISTORY,
POLITICS AND EDUCATION (1990)). See also William E. Connolly, IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC
NEGOTIATIONS OF POLITICAL PARADOX 198 (1991)).
167
See Scaperlanda, supra note __, at 718. One either has equal status as a citizen among other citizens, or
lesser status as an alien. “When citizenship is understood as formal legal membership in the polity, aliens remain
outsiders to citizenship: they reside in the host country only at the country's discretion; there are often restrictions
imposed on their travel; they are denied the right to participate politically at the national level; and they are often
precluded from naturalizing.” Bosniak, Citizenship, supra note __ at 461-62.
168
Bosniak, Citizenship, supra note __, at 480. Patriotism “takes as given that members of the nation
experience themselves as part of a collective whole, part of a shared national culture or project.” Id. at 481. This
approach to citizenship has attracted critique as myopically focused on the nation-state as the location of citizenship,
when individuals often experience stronger feelings of identity and solidarity with social or cultural groups or with
transnational and transborder groups other than members of the same nation, or with a more global community. See
id. at 480-85 (arguing that that “at least some politically and socially-based non-state communities— including some
that have taken form across national boundaries—can serve as sites of citizenship identity and solidarity”); id. at 480
n. 136 (citing Ernest Gellner, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983)).
169
Id. at 463-64(describing the enjoyment of rights as “the defining feature of societal membership”).
170
Cleveland, supra note __, at 273-77(citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318-19, 322). She notes “The
decisions in the Indian, alien, and territory cases do much to explain, though not to justify, the inherent powers
analysis of Curtiss-Wright.” Id. at 273 (proposing that these cases engendered the turn toward extra-constitutional
sources of inherent federal power, the absence of limitations on that power from individual constitutional protections,
and the extreme judicial deference that later appeared in Curtiss-Wright as the three hallmarks of the plenary power
doctrine).
171
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318 (citing Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890); Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893)).
172
Id. at 318 (stating that “[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in
foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens”).
173
317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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claimed U.S. citizenship.
C.

Ex Parte Quirin: Breaking Down the Citizen/Alien Divide

Ex Parte Quirin appears to radically depart from Milligan in subjecting
a U.S. citizen accused of colluding with the enemy to a military tribunal rather
than the criminal process.174 Scholars have labeled Quirin an unprecedented
expansion of federal power in its deference to the executive’s military trial of
a U.S. citizen when the civilian courts were open and available.175 Yet Quirin
follows the lead of Milligan and the early plenary power cases in focusing on
the indicia of full citizenship and the quality of the community with which the
Court associates the citizen seeking habeas corpus. Quirin and the more
recent enemy combatant cases reveal an emphatic distancing of the petitioners
from the community of U.S. citizens, and a relocation of the accused citizens
to the realm of foreigners.
1.

Ex Parte Quirin: the Citizen Outsider

As in Milligan, the issue in Quirin was whether the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments required a jury trial rather than a military trial.176 In Quirin, the
Court denied writs of habeas corpus to eight soldiers of the German army.177
The soldiers had been delivered by submarine to beaches on Long Island and
in Florida with instructions to destroy war industries and facilities in the
United States.178 They were arrested in Chicago and New York City, and tried
before a military tribunal.179 The eight challenged the jurisdiction of the
military tribunals to try them when the civil courts were open and
functioning.180 One, Herbert Haupt, claimed to be a naturalized citizen and
asserted that, consistent with Milligan, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
precluded a military trial.181 The Court declined to inquire into Haupt’s claim
174

Quirin, 317 U.S. at 40-45.
See Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty
Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261, 270 (Spring 2002); A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited,
2003 WIS. L. REV. 309, 361-63 (2003) [hereinafter “Quirin”]; Katyal & Tribe, supra note __, at 1296 (2002); Saito,
Legality After September 11, supra note __, at 47.
176
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 40-45.
177
Id. at 48.
178
Id. at 21. Upon landing in the United States, they removed their uniforms and buried them. Id. at 21. It is
likely that they landed in uniform in order to ensure that, if captured, they would be classified as lawful combatants
under international conventions. See Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J.
INT'L L. 328, 335 (2002); Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31 (defining an unlawful combatant as one “who without uniform
comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property”).
179
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21.
180
Id. at 18-19, 24.
181
Id. at 20, 24. Although Quirin addresses only Haupt’s claim of citizenship, in fact there was another
naturalized citizen among the eight whose citizenship the Court never mentions. See Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and
Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military Governance in a Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 649, 735 (August 2002) (citing Robert E. Cushman, Ex Parte Quirin et al.--The Nazi Saboteur Case, 28
175
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to citizenship,182 reasoning that there was no distinction between alien and
citizen belligerents. Since the federal government exercised discretion over
both, the Court upheld the use of the military commission to try Haupt.183
In contrast to the elevation of citizenship status in Milligan, Quirin
entirely subordinated the role of citizenship in the inquiry about the
constitutional rights of citizens suspected of being enemy combatants. The
opinion accomplished this in three moves, each of which implicates
membership principles. First, it aligned the petitioner with outsiders –
Haupt’s German companions.184 In the process it excluded him from
membership in the U.S. citizenry and from the benefits of the constitutional
contract. Second, it aggregated citizens and non-citizens within a single
category, the “enemy belligerent,”185 permitting the same legal standards to
apply to all within it. Third, it applied law governing foreigners and foreign
nations. In short, Quirin’s aggregation of citizens and non-citizens within the
single category of enemy belligerents admits, with one stroke, the application
to a U.S. citizen of norms created to apply to non-citizens and pseudo-citizens.
The opinion’s introduction of Haupt aligns him with the non-citizen
petitioners so strongly that he is indistinguishable from them:
All the petitioners were born in Germany; all have lived in the United States.
All returned to Germany between 1933 and 1941. All except petitioner Haupt
are admittedly citizens of the German Reich, with which the United States is at
war.”186

Like Milligan and the plenary power cases, the Court’s description of
Haupt burrows beneath the surface of formal citizenship status. Haupt’s U.S.
citizenship is submerged within his identification with the seven German
citizens.
The Court in Quirin distinguishes Haupt from the archetypal member
of the citizenry in a way that contrasts with Milligan’s refrain about the
petitioner’s long-term association with the state of Indiana. The Court
highlights the involuntary and inadvertent nature of Haupt’s acquisition of
citizenship: “Haupt came to this country with his parents when he was five
CORNELL L.Q. 54, 54 (1942)). Ernest Peter Burger immigrated to the United States in 1927 and naturalized in 1933.
He later returned to Germany, where he joined the Nazi Storm Troopers. See Michal R. Belknap, A Putrid Pedigree:
The Bush Administration’s Military Tribunals in Historical Perspective, 38 CAL. W.L. REV. 433, 471 n. 287 (2002)
(citing David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, J. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC'Y 61, 62-63 (1996)).
182
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38.
183
Id. at 44. Quirin has been criticized as lacking in precedent, hastily decided, and politically and
circumstantially motivated. E.g., Bryant & Tobias, Quirin, supra note __, at 361-63; Belknap, supra note __, at 47177. See also Katyal & Tribe, supra note __, at 1291 (suggesting that “Quirin plainly fits the criteria typically offered
for judicial confinement or reconsideration” because it was “rendered under extreme time pressure, with respect to
which there are virtually no reliance interests at stake, and where the statute itself has constitutional dimensions
suggesting that its construction should be guided by relevant developments in constitutional law.”).
184
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20.
185
Id. at 24.
186
Id. at 20.
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years old; it is contended that he became a citizen of the United States by
virtue of the naturalization of his parents during his minority and that he has
not since lost his citizenship.”187 Haupt thus arrived in the United States when
he was too young to make weighty decisions about nationality, and his
claimed naturalization was second-hand, trickling down through his parents.
The Court portrays Haupt as an accidental citizen; one who acquired
citizenship through no fault of his own, and, for unexplained reasons, never
lost it.
At this point, the Court was at a crossroads. It could have taken up the
question whether Haupt was a citizen as a formal matter by deciding whether,
as the government contended, Haupt had “renounced or abandoned his United
States citizenship” and “elected to maintain German allegiance and
citizenship.”188 If the Court had found that Haupt was not a citizen, it might
have avoided altogether considering the role of citizenship in determining an
accused citizen’s constitutional rights.
In a brief paragraph, the Court discarded the relevance of Haupt’s
citizenship to whether he could be tried by a military commission in an area of
the United States where the civil courts were operating.189 It reasoned that
U.S. citizenship does not relieve citizens “who associate themselves with the
military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and
direction enter this country bent on hostile acts” from the consequences of a
violation of the law of war.190 It distinguished Milligan from Haupt on that
basis because, unlike Haupt, “Milligan, not being a part of or associated with
the armed forces of the enemy, was a non-belligerent, not subject to the law of
war….”191
This passage can be read as merely distinguishing Haupt from Milligan
by labeling Haupt an enemy belligerent and Milligan as a non-belligerent.192
But the distinction does not hold up under scrutiny. Although the Court
asserted that the difference between Haupt and Milligan lay in Haupt’s
187

Id.
Id. at 20. The government’s position was based on legislation that permitted the involuntary
denationalization of a naturalized citizen who returned to his home country or of any citizen who served in the armed
forces of a foreign state. See Nationality Act of Mar. 2, 1907, 34 Stat. 1228, ch. 2534, § 2 (establishing a
presumption that a naturalized citizen who returned to live in the country of origin would forfeit U.S. citizenship);
Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401, 54 Stat. 1137, 1169 (providing for loss of citizenship because of service in
the armed forces of a foreign state, serving as a government employee of a foreign state, or voting in foreign
elections, among other bases); see also Peter J. Spiro, Questioning Barriers to Naturalization, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
479, 505 & n. 128-29 (Summer 1999). Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that expatriation was unconstitutional
without the consent of the citizen. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 261 (1980) (holding expatriation permissible
only where citizen intended to denaturalize); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 256 (1967) (declaring unconstitutional
expatriation for voting in foreign election).
189
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38; see also Katyal & Tribe, supra note __, at 1296 (noting “the very precedent
[President Bush] seeks to revitalize, Quirin, explicitly permits military tribunals to be used against American citizens
who are ‘unlawful belligerents’ within our own borders”).
190
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38 (citing Gates v. Goodloe, 101 U.S. 612, 615, 617, 618 (1879)).
191
Id. at 45.
192
Id.
188
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association with the armed forces of the enemy,193 the offenses alleged in both
cases are difficult to distinguish. Milligan and his secret society, like the
saboteurs in Quirin, were accused of aiding the enemy, inciting insurrection,
disrupting the war effort, and conspiring to send arms and currency to the
enemy.194 While Milligan was not accused of wearing the uniform of the
enemy army, the charges against him were, in essence, the same as those in
Quirin — that he “associated” with the enemy and was “bent on hostile
acts.”195
Quirin is consistent with Milligan and the immigrant and Native
American cases because it applied a kind of “minimum contacts” test,196
analyzing certain factors that signal connection with the United States, e.g.,
the citizen’s place of birth, length of residence in the United States, and
residence (or lack thereof) in enemy territory. Quirin contrasted Haupt’s
accidental acquisition of citizenship by echoing Milligan’s recurring emphasis
on the indicia of full citizenship, describing Milligan as “a citizen twenty years
resident in Indiana, who had never been a resident of any of the states in
rebellion.”197 Unlike Milligan, Quirin focused on Haupt’s lack of connection
to the United States and his alignment with a belligerent foreign nation to
conclude that no constitutional protections applied. Justice Stone’s analysis of
the quality of Haupt’s citizenship resulted in excluding him from the national
membership in a way that is reminiscent of the resident aliens in the
immigrant exclusion cases and the pseudo-citizens of the Native American
cases.
Quirin also evaluated the second level of the social contract in which
the state or national community holds a constitutional interest in the rights that
an accused citizen asserts. Like Milligan’s focus on the loyalty of the state of
Indiana and its near-silence about the acts Milligan was accused of, Quirin
highlighted Haupt’s association with a community: the citizenry of Germany
and the members of its army. Using this lens, the Court’s characterization of
Haupt as indistinguishable from the other Germans allowed the group of
German soldiers to act as a proxy for his membership in the same way that the
citizens of Indiana did for Milligan or the tribes did for individual Native
Americans. Haupt’s association with the members of the enemy nation
excluded him from the benefits of the social contract.
Aligning Haupt so completely with the rest of the German soldiers
foreclosed any judicial consideration of the interest of another potential party
to the social contract: the citizenry of the United States. The opinion does not
confront the possibility that the military trial of Haupt deprived the people of
193

Id.
Milligan, 71 U.S at 6, 122.
Id.
196
See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316.
197
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45.
194
195
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the United States of a constitutionally significant interest in participating in
the process of determining Haupt’s guilt.
2.

The Alien Citizen

Quirin erased the distinction between citizen and non-citizen enemy
belligerents. Drawing a parallel between aliens and “citizen enemies,” the
Court reasoned that since the Fifth and Sixth Amendments permitted military
trial of “offenders [who] are aliens not members of our Armed Forces, it is
plain that [the Amendments] present no greater obstacle to the trial in like
manner of citizen enemies . . . .”198
The Court contrasted this undifferentiated enemy belligerent category
with members of the loyal community. It asserted that the drafters of the
Constitution would not have excepted “members of our own armed forces
charged with infractions of the Articles of War” from the guarantee of trial by
jury while extending it to “alien or citizen offenders against the law of war.”199
These “members of our own armed forces” are parties to the social contract
and embody archetypal members of the national community.200 It would be
inconsistent to deny constitutional protections to these full members while
granting them to aliens and pseudo-citizens outside of the constitutional
contract.
The Court’s description of Haupt’s citizenship as an inadvertent
naturalization and the consequent devolution in his status to that of an alien
without constitutional protections is reminiscent of the way that membership
principles limited the constitutional rights of immigrants and Native
Americans under the plenary power doctrine. Just as the Court drew on
principles from the immigrant exclusion cases to expand plenary authority
over Native Americans,201 Quirin drew on a parallel to aliens to minimize the
role of citizenship in determining whether constitutional protections applied to
Haupt. Similarly, the conclusion that Native Americans, though nominally
citizens, were incapable of membership in the national community mirrors
Quirin’s portrayal of Haupt’s accidental citizenship and his resulting
exclusion from full citizenship. In both contexts, the Court concluded that
citizenship alone did not bestow constitutional protection against the
198

Id. at 44.
Id.
200
The armed forces also constitute a category that does not distinguish on the basis of citizenship status. They
are composed of both citizens and non-citizens, as the Court points out in its reference to “aliens not members of our
Armed Forces.” Quirin, 317 U.S. at 44. In this light, the Court appears to act as an equalizing force, erasing
distinctions based on citizenship so that citizen and alien alike, loyal member and disloyal belligerent alike, receive
equal protection under the Constitution when accused of the same offenses.
201
See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (relying on Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) to
hold that Congress could abrogate treaties with Indians in the same way that it could abrogate treaties with foreign
nations).
199
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sovereign power of the government.
3.

Membership and Plenary Power

Breaching the divide between citizenship and alienage in Quirin
coincides with the appearance of central elements of the plenary power
doctrine. Quirin embodies a struggle between the enumerated powers doctrine
that held sway in Milligan and the plenary power doctrine developed in the
Native American and immigration cases. The opinion does not rely expressly
on the plenary power doctrine, and in fact Justice Stone asserts in his opinion
that the enumerated powers doctrine governs his analysis.202 Yet all three
hallmarks of the plenary power doctrine ground the decision: reliance on
inherent federal power derived from sources of law that originate outside of
the Constitution; diminished constitutional limitations on federal government
power; and judicial deference to the executive and legislative branches.203
The opinion relies in the main upon the first hallmark of the plenary
power doctrine: sources of law, particularly international law and preconstitutional norms,204 that were considered outside of the enumerated
powers of the government in Milligan’s time.
The Court elevated
international law to primary status over constitutional or domestic law as
precedent to determine Haupt’s rights.205 The Court held that “[c]itizens who
associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with
its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts are
enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law
of war.”206 The use of international law at this juncture is significant because,
in line with the plenary power doctrine, it originates outside of the
constitutional framework and therefore apart from the social contract.207
202
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25 (stating “Congress and the President, like the courts, possess no power not derived
from the Constitution”). Justice Stone also framed the relevant issue in terms of constitutional limits on federal
power: “We are concerned only with the question whether it is within the constitutional power of the national
government to place petitioners upon trial before a military commission for the offenses with which they are
charged.” Id. at 29.
203
See discussion of the elements of the plenary power doctrine, supra, notes __ -- __ and accompanying text.
See also Cleveland, supra note __, at 5 (describing the characteristics of the plenary power doctrine).
204
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318; see Cleveland, supra note __, at 5.
205
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38.
206
Id. at 37-38.
207
Id. at 29. The Court concluded that the “laws and usages of war” were within the constitutional boundaries
of the congressional power: “By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so
far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against
the law of war in appropriate cases. Congress, in addition to making rules for the government of our Armed Forces,
has thus exercised its authority to define and punish offenses against the law of nations by sanctioning, within
constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of military commissions.” Id. at 28 (emphasis added). This is exactly the
argument that Milligan rejected as outside of the enumerated powers of the Constitution. Milligan held that neither
the “laws or usages of war” nor the laws of nations empowered the legislature or the executive to use a military
commission to try a citizen who was not a member of the armed forces. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121-22 (declaring that
the laws and usages of war could “never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of the
government, and where the courts are open and their process unobstructed . . . Congress could grant no such power”).
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Quirin turned also to conventions of war formulated for non-citizens
prior to the Constitution.208 The Court first determined that enemy
belligerents fell neither within the guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments nor within the stated exception for members of the armed
forces.209 It looked outside the text of the Constitution and outside the realm
of citizenship to pre-constitutional rules of war that permitted the military trial
of “alien spies” without a jury.210 Based on those rules, Quirin broadly
exempted from the Fifth Amendment the military trial, without a jury, of
enemies for offenses against the law of war.211
The second hallmark of the plenary power doctrine, a diminishing of
the power of individual constitutional rights,212 is consistent with the Court’s
conclusion that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not apply. The third
hallmark of the plenary power doctrine, judicial deference to inherent federal
power, also emerged in Quirin.213 Although the Court initially claimed broad
jurisdiction to review executive branch actions affecting individual
constitutional safeguards,214 it later retreated from this role when it reached the
question of the scope of the executive’s power. In an echo of Curtiss-Wright’s
warning that the courts should “hesitate long before limiting or embarrassing
the executive when wielding the ‘powers of nationality’ or relations with other
countries,”215 the Court yielded to the discretion of the executive. It declared
208

Quirin, 317 U.S. at 33, 41-44.
Id. at 40-43.
Id. In construing the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the Court relied on a statute passed contemporaneously
with the Amendments that had permitted the military trial of alien spies “according to the law and usage of nations.”
Id. at 41 (citing § 2 of the Act of Congress of April 10, 1806, 2 Stat. 371). It was later amended to include citizen
spies. 34 U.S.C. § 1200; see Quirin, 317 U.S. at 42 n.14 (noting that “in 1862 Congress amended the spy statute to
include ‘all persons’ instead of only aliens”). Quirin relied on this later inclusion of citizens as support for erasing
the citizen/alien distinction, stating, “[u]nder the original statute authorizing trial of alien spies by military tribunals,
the offenders were outside the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury, not because they were aliens but only because
they had violated the law of war.” 317 U.S. at 44.
211
Id. at 41-44. The opinion asserts that its conclusion was consistent with “a contemporary construction of
both Article III, s 2, and the Amendments.” Id. at 41. This construction of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments was
contested in the parties’ briefs in Milligan, and rejected as outside the enumerated powers of the Constitution.
Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121-33; see id. at 30 (On the Side of the Petitioner) (“These acts do not confer upon military
commissions jurisdiction over any persons other than those in the military service and spies”); id. at 99-100 (Reply of
the United States) (describing the use of military commissions to try and execute spies and traitors during the
Revolutionary War). Without expressly addressing the government’s analogy to spies and traitors, Milligan
concluded that there were no implicit exceptions to the right to trial by jury. That right “is preserved to every one
accused of crime who is not attached to the army, or navy, or militia in actual service.” Id. at 123.
212
See Cleveland, supra note __, at 5.
213
Cf. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 379 (Spring
2002) (asserting that the Court in Quirin exercised “federal judicial authority and resolved challenges to the
constitutionality of presidential orders on the merits”). Bryant and Tobias’ analysis is partly in tension with my
reading of the case. It is true that the Court agreed to accept jurisdiction; however, its explicit deference to executive
power raised the bar for the application of individual constitutional rights in a way that is characteristic of judicial
deference under the plenary power doctrine.
214
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 19. In setting the stage for the Court’s inquiry, Justice Stone spoke “of the duty which
rests on the courts, in time of war as well as in time of peace, to preserve unimpaired the constitutional safeguards of
civil liberty.” Id. at 19. Neither the President’s attempt to limit judicial review nor the petitioners’ status as “enemy
aliens” could “foreclose[] consideration by the courts of petitioners’ contentions that the Constitution and laws of the
United States constitutionally enacted forbid their trial by military commission.” Id. at 25.
215
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 322.
209
210
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that the courts should not interfere with a military detention and trial “ordered
by the President in the declared exercise of his powers as Commander in Chief
of the Army in time of war and of grave public danger” without a “clear
conviction that they are in conflict with the Constitution or laws of Congress
constitutionally enacted.”216 This “clear conviction” allowed for a greater
level of judicial review than the abject deference that the plenary power
doctrine would eventually require.217 Still, it was a far remove from the proactive judicial inquiry that Milligan employed under the enumerated powers
doctrine.218
II.

THE RECENT ENEMY COMBATANT CASES

Hamdi and Padilla present a question unexplored by Milligan or
Quirin: the constitutional legitimacy of indefinite military detention in the
United States, without trial, of a U.S. citizen alleged to be an enemy
combatant.219 The two cases confront head-on – for the first time – whether
the plenary power applies to U.S. citizens in the United States who are
suspected enemy combatants. The Fourth Circuit relied on the plenary power
doctrine to uphold Hamdi’s indefinite detention, deferring to the President’s
declaration that Hamdi was an enemy combatant.220 In Padilla, the Second
Circuit held that Padilla’s detention was unconstitutional.221 It rejected the
government’s argument that under the plenary power doctrine, the President’s
declaration that Padilla was an enemy combatant justified the detention and
mandated judicial deference to executive power.222

216

Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25.
Wishnie, supra note __, at 503 & n.49 (noting that in the cases establishing the doctrine, “the Supreme Court
declared that Congress and the Executive Branch possessed a ‘plenary immigration power,’ and that exercises of this
power largely were immune from judicial oversight”) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724, 730
(1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581,
609 (1889)).
218
Milligan, 71 U.S. at 115, 122.
219
Milligan and Quirin both addressed claims that a criminal rather than a military trial was the proper forum
for addressing the government’s suspicions. Id. at 118;Quirin, 317 U.S. at 40-45.
220
Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 474 (holding that “a factual inquiry into the circumstances of Hamdi’s capture would
be inappropriate” and rejecting “any evaluation of the accuracy of the executive branch’s determination that a person
is an enemy combatant”). Hamdi allegedly fought on the side of the Taliban during the United States’ military action
in Afghanistan. Id.at 460. Hamdi was “captured or transferred into the cust ody of the United States” in Afghanistan
in the fall of 2001 and transported from Afghanistan to Camp X-Ray at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, in January 2002. Id. When the authorities there learned of his citizenship, he was transferred to the
Norfolk Naval Station Brig in Virginia. Id.
221
Padilla, 352 F.3d at 699. Padilla is suspected of conspiring with al Queda to build a radiological bomb and
set it off in the United States. Id. at 700. In May 2002, Padilla was arrested in Chicago on a material witness warrant
related to a grand jury investigation into al Queda’s role in the September 11 attacks. Id. at 699, 700. The following
month, President Bush ordered the Secretary of Defense to take custody of Padilla. Id. at 700.
222
Id. at 699.
217
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A. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
The Fourth Circuit generated three panel opinions in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld. The first (“Hamdi I”)223 held that Hamdi’s father had standing to
bring a habeas petition on his son’s behalf.224 Hamdi II225 reversed the district
court’s order granting unmonitored access to counsel.226 Hamdi III227 held
that Hamdi’s detention was constitutional.228 It is the second and third
opinions which are of interest here. In those decisions, the Fourth Circuit
applied the plenary power doctrine for the first time to a U.S. citizen detained
as an enemy belligerent.229
1.

The Membership Test and the Pseudo-Citizen

Hamdi III’s first holding, that the court had jurisdiction to review
Hamdi’s habeas petition,230 gathered him into the fold of American citizenship
and invoked principles of equality among citizens from constitutional
doctrine.231 It stated that “Hamdi’s petition falls squarely within the Great
Writ’s purview, since he is an American citizen challenging his summary
detention for reasons of state necessity.”232 It declared that the Bill of Rights
“applies to American citizens regardless of race, color, or creed . . .,”233
concluding that “[t]he detention of United States citizens must be subject to
judicial review.”234
Consistent with Milligan, at this juncture U.S. citizenship appears to
have an elevating effect on the scope of constitutional protections. It is the
presence of American citizenship that invokes the power of the Bill of Rights:
“Drawing on the Bill of Rights’ historic guarantees, the judiciary plays its
distinctive role in our constitutional structure when it reviews the detention of
American citizens by their own government.”235 The Bill of Rights becomes a
“lens through which we recognize ourselves” as the nation becomes more
223

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Hamdi I”).
Id. at 600 n.1.
225
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Hamdi II”).
226
Id. at 279.
227
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Hamdi III”), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004).
228
Id. at 470-71.
229
Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 281; Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 465.
230
Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 465.
231
Scholars have at times defined citizenship as the rights required to attain “full and equal membership.”
Charles Lund Black, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 33-66 (1969) (defining citizenship as
“the right to be treated fairly when one is the object of action by that government of which one is also a part”). See
also Kenneth Karst, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 1-61, 173-242 (1989)
(describing “equal citizenship” as a core principle of constitutional thought); Bosniak, Citizenship, supra note __, at
450 (citing Judith N. Shklar, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 1 (1991)).
232
Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 465.
233
Id.
234
Id. at 464 (citing Milligan, 71 U.S. at 120).
235
Id.
224
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diverse – a way of identifying the citizen despite the increased diversity of
“race, color, or creed.”236 Calling on equal citizenship principles forestalls
any doubts that Hamdi’s race, color, or religion might be the basis for
excluding him from the circle of citizenship.
In tension with this declaration of equal citizenship is the opinion’s
later application of the membership test which parallels the analysis in Quirin.
Upon reaching the merits, the Fourth Circuit’s portrayal of Hamdi abruptly
transforms him from a citizen-insider to a pseudo-citizen with illusory
citizenship. The opinion is littered with question marks about Hamdi’s status.
The court begins the analysis by stating that “Hamdi is apparently an
American citizen,”237 suggesting a need to look below the surface for a more
accurate impression. In its description of Hamdi’s background, the opinion
more directly questions Hamdi’s claim to citizenship:
Hamdi apparently was born in Louisiana but left for Saudi Arabia when he
was a small child. Although initially detained in Afghanistan and then
Guantanamo Bay, Hamdi was transferred to the Norfolk Naval Station Brig after
it was discovered that he may not have renounced his American citizenship.238

This characterization of Hamdi’s history divorces him from anything
but a tenuous connection with the United States. The statement that Hamdi
“may not have renounced his American citizenship”239 likely refers, as in
Quirin, to whether Hamdi’s had given up his U.S. citizenship status.240 It
suggests that Hamdi’s failure to cast off his citizenship was merely an
oversight on his part. It also implies that the accidental retention of his
citizenship, like a clerical error, might be easily remedied.
The court’s description distinguishes Hamdi from the archetypal
citizen described in Milligan. Milligan’s twenty years living in the loyal state
of Indiana, his continued presence in a state not hostile to the government, and
his presence amidst the upstanding citizenry of Indiana contrast sharply with
Hamdi’s fleeting presence in Louisiana, his residence in a country that the
United States has invaded, and the accident of birth that resulted in his
citizenship. This biographical sketch of Hamdi suggests a much greater
resemblance to Haupt as the citizen saboteur in Quirin than to Milligan as a
member of the Indiana community.
The court’s holding — that Hamdi’s detention is constitutional
because he was captured in an active war zone in a foreign country241 — is
236

Id.
Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
Id. at 460.
239
Id. This statement appears in all of the Hamdi opinions. See Hamdi I, 294 F.3d at 601; Hamdi II, 296 F.3d
at 280.
240
See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
241
Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 459 (holding that because “it is undisputed that Hamdi was captured in a zone of
active combat in a foreign theater of conflict,” his detention was constitutional regardless of his current presence
237
238

9-Mar-04

CITIZENS OF AN ENEMY LAND

33

consistent with the opinion’s portrayal of Hamdi’s inferior citizenship.
Hamdi’s alleged presence in an active war zone may well provide support for
conferring military jurisdiction. Still, the case “arises out of” his military
detention inside the United States,242 and he has been in the United States
throughout the course of judicial review of his petition.
The opinion’s recurring emphasis on Hamdi’s presence on foreign
ground overrides his presence in the United States, instead drawing
connections between Hamdi’s citizenship and that foreign territory.
Whenever Hamdi’s citizenship status appears in the opinion, so too does
foreign geography.243 From the initial framing of the issue, the opinion
repeatedly locates Hamdi outside the United States. Hamdi is “not ‘any
American citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant’ by the government; he is
an American citizen captured and detained by American allied forces in a
foreign theater of war.”244 The court defines “the specific context” of the
decision with reference to Hamdi’s foreign location: “that of the undisputed
detention of a citizen during a combat operation undertaken in a foreign
country and a determination by the executive that the citizen was allied with
enemy forces.”245 The recurring references in Hamdi III to Hamdi’s presence
in foreign territory246 connect him to that territory despite his citizenship and
his presence in the United States.
within the United States).
242
Id. at 460.
243
Id. (“Although initially detained in Afghanistan and then Guantanamo Bay, Hamdi was transferred to the
Norfolk Naval Station Brig after it was discovered that he may not have renounced his American citizenship”;
“Hamdi is a citizen of the United States who was residing in Afghanistan”; “Although acknowledging that Hamdi
was seized in Afghanistan …the petition alleges that "as an American citizen, ... Hamdi enjoys the full protections of
the Constitution’”); id. at 462 (“Yaser Esam Hamdi is apparently an American citizen. He was also captured by
allied forces in Afghanistan.”), 465 (“the undisputed detention of a citizen during a combat operation undertaken in a
foreign country”), 471 (“Hamdi's American citizenship has entitled him to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus”
followed closely by: “Hamdi's petition alleges that he was a resident of and seized in Afghanistan”), 473 (addressing
“whether, because he is an American citizen currently detained on American soil by the military, Hamdi can be heard
. . . to rebut the . . . ‘enemy combatant’ designation. We hold that no evidentiary hearing . . . is necessary . . . because
. . . Hamdi was captured in a zone of active combat operations in a foreign country”), 475 (“One who takes up arms
against the United States in a foreign theater of war, regardless of his citizenship, may properly be designated an
enemy combatant”), 476 (“despite his status as an American citizen currently detained on American soil, Hamdi is
not entitled to challenge the facts . . . . Where . . . a habeas petitioner has been designated an enemy combatant and it
is undisputed that he was captured in an zone of active combat operations abroad”), 476 (“Hamdi is not "any
American citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant" by the government; he is an American citizen captured and
detained by American allied forces in a foreign theater of war”).
244
Id. at 476.
245
Id. at 465.
246
Id. at 459 (“Hamdi was captured in a zone of active combat in a foreign theater of conflict”), 460 (“Although
initially detained in Afghanistan”; “Hamdi is a citizen of the United States who was residing in Afghanistan when he
was seized”; “Hamdi was seized in Afghanistan”), 461 (“if Hamdi is indeed an 'enemy combatant' who was captured
during hostilities in Afghanistan”; “Mobbs … confirms that Hamdi was seized in Afghanistan”, “it is undisputed that
Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan”), 470 (referring to “a detainee's [Hamdi’s] activities in Afghanistan”), 471
(“Hamdi's petition alleges that he was a resident of and seized in Afghanistan”), 472, 473 (“it is undisputed that
Hamdi was captured in a zone of active combat operations in a foreign country”), 475 (“One who takes up arms
against the United States in a foreign theater of war”; “we reject Hamdi's argument that even if his initial detention in
Afghanistan was lawful, his continuing detention on American soil is not”), 476 (“he is an American citizen captured
and detained by American allied forces in a foreign theater of war”).
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These connections and characterizations are more than just rhetorical
devices to bolster the court’s holding. The characterization of Hamdi as
having no true link to the United States and the questioning of his status as a
citizen reveal an understanding that despite Hamdi’s citizenship, he is
essentially an alien. This depiction of Hamdi opens the way for the
application of norms traditionally applied to non-citizens, including the
plenary power doctrine.
2.

Plenary Power and the Application of Non-Citizen Norms

Hamdi represents the first time that a court has explicitly applied the
plenary power doctrine to U.S. citizens detained in the United States under the
suspicion that they are unlawful enemy combatants. Citing Curtiss-Wright,
the Fourth Circuit declared in Hamdi II that “the Supreme Court has shown
great deference to the political branches when called upon to decide cases
implicating sensitive matters of foreign policy, national security, or military
affairs”247 and that the President has “delicate, plenary and exclusive power . .
. as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations.”248 The court extended that plenary power to “military designations
of individuals as enemy combatants in times of active hostilities, as well as to
their detention after capture on the field of battle.”249 The opinion concludes
that Hamdi is not entitled to “the safeguards that all Americans have come to
expect in criminal prosecutions.”250 This open reliance on the plenary power
doctrine is a significant step from Quirin’s nominal adherence to an
enumerated power doctrine and its submerged use of the plenary power
doctrine.
As in Quirin, the exclusion of the citizen from the social contract and
the subsequent use of the plenary power doctrine make way for precedent
governing non-citizens that results in diminished constitutional rights.251 As a
prelude to the denial of habeas, Hamdi III drew an analogy to the executive’s
power “to deport or detain alien enemies during the duration of hostilities
….”252 Accompanied by a reference to Ludecke v. Watkins, which addressed
247

Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 281 (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319-20).
Id. (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320).
249
Id. The opinion sought to locate that plenary power in the enumerated powers of the Constitution: “Indeed,
Articles I and II prominently assign to Congress and the President the shared responsibility for military affairs. See
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; art. II, § 2. In accordance with this constitutional text, the Supreme Court has shown great
deference to the political branches when called upon to decide cases implicating sensitive matters of foreign policy,
national security, or military affairs.” Id. at 281.
250
Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 465.
251
Id. at 463 & n.3 (citing Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)), 466
(citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)), 468 (citing Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir.
1978)), 469 (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 789 n.14), 473 (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 793), 474 (citing INS v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311 (1925); Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779), 476 (citing
Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 169).
252
Id. at 463.
248

9-Mar-04

CITIZENS OF AN ENEMY LAND

35

the internment and deportation during World War II of enemy aliens deemed
dangerous by the Attorney General, 253 it places Hamdi squarely on the noncitizen side of the citizenship line. Similarly, the court cited as a source for
the term “enemy combatant” In re Yamashita,254 which denied the habeas
petition of a non-citizen.255 Finally, it considered and rejected as insufficiently
deferential the legal standard governing the detention of criminal aliens
detained in the United States.256
The Fourth Circuit’s rejection of the legitimacy of Hamdi’s citizenship
reveals itself in its reliance on these non-citizen cases. Like Quirin, Hamdi
places citizens and aliens on the same level and creates a category of pseudocitizens to whom standards governing non-citizens apply.
B. Padilla v. Rumsfeld
In Padilla, the Second Circuit held that military detention of an
American citizen seized on American soil outside a zone of combat was
unconstitutional without explicit Congressional approval.257 The majority
opinion departed from Hamdi’s analysis in three ways. First, it did not
evaluate the petitioner’s association with a foreign community to distinguish
citizens entitled to constitutional protections from pseudo-citizens who are
not. Second, it rejected the application of the plenary power doctrine to a
citizen in Padilla’s circumstances.258
Third, principles and precedent
governing non-citizens do not drive the majority opinion. In contrast, the
dissent reintroduces all of these analytical modes and would hold the detention
constitutional upon a minimal evidentiary showing.259

253

Id. at 463 & n.3 (citing Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 173).
Id. at 463 n.3 (citing Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 7).
255
Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 26 (denying habeas petition of Japanese general and holding that the Executive had
authority to use a military commission after hostilities had ended and before peace had been declared).
256
Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 473 (holding that “a factual inquiry into the circumstances of Hamdi’s capture would
be inappropriate” and rejecting “any evaluation of the accuracy of the executive branch’s determination that a person
is an enemy combatant”); see id. at 474 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 306 (2001)). The Fourth Circuit rejected
Hamdi’s contention based on St. Cyr that at least “some evidence” must support a determination that a citizen was an
enemy combatant, instead deferring to allegations in the executive branch’s declaration without providing Hamdi an
opportunity to rebut them. Id. By applying a lower standard of evidence to Hamdi than that required to detain
immigrants without a trial, see St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 306, the opinion erected a hierarchy of membership in which
citizens accused as enemy combatants inhabit the bottom rung. At the top are U.S. citizens holding full membership
in the citizenry who are entitled to the “reasonable doubt” evidentiary standard of a criminal trial. Below them are
criminal aliens awaiting deportation who are entitled to review of whether there is “some evidence” to support the
detention. Id. at 306. At the bottom are U.S. citizens alleged to be enemy combatants, entitled to no review at all.
257
Padilla, 352 F.3d at 699. The district court had held that the detention was constitutional once the federal
government produced “some evidence” that Padilla was an unlawful enemy combatant. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 256 F.
Supp. 2d 564, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying the “some evidence” standard drawn from cases establishing the
constitutional rights of detained aliens).
258
Padilla, 352 F.3d at 711-18.
259
Id. at 730 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
254
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Padilla and the Prototypical Citizen

In contrast to Hamdi, the Second Circuit’s characterization of Padilla
emphatically affirmed his citizenship. Padilla’s first appearance in the opinion
emphasizes his nationality and his presence in the United States: “On May 8,
2002, Jose Padilla, an American citizen, flew on his American passport from
Pakistan, via Switzerland, to Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport.”260 The
repetitive invocation of the term “American,” the evidence of his citizenship
in his passport, and the ease with which he entered the United States highlight
the strength of Padilla’s connection with the U.S. citizenry. The link between
Padilla’s citizenship and the United States is most clear in the opinion’s
characterization of Padilla as the archetypal “American citizen” on “American
soil.”261 The majority repeatedly draws connections between Padilla, his
citizenship and his physical presence in the United States that contrast with the
Fourth Circuit’s identification of Hamdi with foreign territory.262
Absent from Padilla is the kind of analysis of Padilla’s connection to
the United States or to an aberrant or enemy group that appeared in Hamdi,
Quirin, and the immigrant and Native American plenary power cases. Based
on Padilla’s formal citizenship status alone, the majority includes him as a
member of the citizenry “entitled to the constitutional protections extended to
other citizens.”263
It rejects the government’s attempt to apply the
membership test in Quirin, stating that it is “not persuaded” by the
government’s assertion of “factual parallels between the Quirin saboteurs and
Padilla.”264
The majority’s depiction of Padilla as the prototypical citizen stands in
stark contrast to the dissent’s exclusion of him from the citizenry. Judge
Wesley’s “U.S. citizens” require executive protection from “acts of
belligerency on U.S. soil that would cause [them] harm”265 rather than
constitutional protection against executive power. Padilla is not a member of
260

Id. at 699.
Id.
262
Id at 698 (“Jose Padilla, an American citizen held by military authorities as an enemy combatant”; “an
American citizen seized on American soil”), 699 (“American citizens on American soil”), 702 (“Does the President
have the authority to designate as an enemy combatant an American citizen captured within the United States . . .?),
711 (“our review is limited to the case of an American citizen arrested in the United States”), 712 (“we find that the
President lacks inherent constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief to detain American citizens on American
soil outside a zone of combat”, “the Joint Resolution does not authorize the President to detain American citizens
seized on American soil”), 713 (“whether the Constitution gives the President the power to detain an American
citizen seized in this country”), 721 (“the President, acting alone, possesses no inherent constitutional authority to
detain American citizens seized within the United States, away from a zone of combat”) 721 n.29 (holding that the
President's Commander-in-Chief powers are not plenary “in the context of a domestic seizure of an American
citizen”), 722 (“the authority to use military force” does not include “the authority to detain American citizens seized
on American soil”), 723 (“The plain language of the Joint Resolution contains nothing authorizing the detention of
American citizens captured on United States soil”), 724 (“the President's inherent constitutional powers do not extend
to the detention . . . of an American citizen seized within the country away from a zone of combat”).
263
Id. at 724.
264
Id. at 716 n.26.
265
Id. at 727 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
261
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the citizenry; rather, he is the impending harm. He is “a terrorist citizen
dangerously close to a violent or destructive act on U.S. soil,”266 a “U.S.
citizen who is alleged to have ties to the belligerent and who is part of a plan
for belligerency on U.S. soil,”267 and, in an evocative transformation from
person to object, “a loaded weapon of al Qaeda.”268
The majority opinion in Padilla applies the second level of the social
contract in much the way that Milligan did. As in Milligan, the collective
constitutional interests of national and state communities play a part in the
decision.269 The opinion’s reasoning that the Constitution requires explicit
congressional action for Padilla’s military detention parallels Milligan’s
concern that a military trial would bypass the collective voice of the nation:
Congress had “declared penalties against the offences charged, provided for
their punishment, and directed [the civil courts] to hear and determine
them.”270
Moreover, as in Milligan, the executive’s imposition of military
control in Padilla usurped a civilian grand jury’s constitutional role. The
court describes Padilla’s arrest “in connection with a grand jury investigation
of the terrorist attacks of September 11” and describes the executive’s
interruption of those proceedings.271 Reminiscent of Milligan’s reluctance to
undercut the competence of the Indiana grand jury, the Second Circuit twice
invokes the grand jury as a constitutional route for proceedings regarding
Padilla.272
2.

Plenary Power and Law Governing Non-Citizens

Having constructed an image of Padilla as a member of the American
citizenry in the United States, the majority rejects the government’s claim that
266

Id. at 728.
Id. at 732.
268
Id. at 730. Judge Wesley would have affirmed the district court’s opinion. Id. at 726. As in Quirin, Hamdi,
and the nineteenth century plenary power cases, the district court applied the plenary power doctrine after a factbased test for membership in the citizenry. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 571-74. Judge Mukasey depicted Padilla as
sharply breaking with the law-abiding citizens of the United States and turning instead to a foreign and hostile
community. Id. Padilla rejected the laws of his birthplace by committing murder as a teenager, changed his name to
one distinctly Middle Eastern, changed his residence to Egypt, and traveled to Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan where
he allegedly met with al Queda. Id. at 572. This description of Padilla is sandwiched between a description of the
September 11 attacks, the government’s allegations that Padilla associated with al Queda, and a description of the
1998 al Queda bombings of United States embassies. Id. at 570-75.
269
Id. at 699.
270
Id.; see also Milligan, 71 U.S. at 122. Padilla steers clear of holding that congressional authorization would
render the detention constitutional: “Nor do we express any opinion as to the hypothetical situation of a
congressionally authorized detention of an American citizen.” Padilla, 352 F.3d at 699.
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Padilla, 352 F.3d at 699.
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Id. (ordering Padilla’s release from military custody and suggesting that Padilla could be “transferred to the
appropriate civilian authorities who can bring criminal charges against him. If appropriate, he can also be held as a
material witness in connection with grand jury proceedings.”); id. at 711 (stating “he arrived in New York as a
material witness in a grand jury investigation related to the September 11 attacks and departed an enemy
combatant”).
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detaining Padilla is within the President’s plenary power.273 It confines the
plenary power doctrine to cases involving “external affairs” and characterizes
this case as one involving “internal affairs” over which the President cannot
exercise unilateral power.274
Unlike the Fourth Circuit’s analogies to alien enemies and its
consideration of standards governing the detention of criminal aliens,275
Padilla does not rely upon principles governing non-citizens. This, too, is in
tension with the dissent. Judge Wesley’s dissent argues for a hearing to
determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support Padilla’s military
detention, using the standard from Zadvydas v. Davis276 which required “some
evidence” to justify indefinite detention of deportable aliens.277
Hamdi and Padilla present different factual contexts, involving
different conduct, different geographical boundaries and different allegations
of involvement with forces opposing the United States. The paramount
significance of membership principles, however, is common to both. The
Padilla majority’s inclusion of Padilla within the realm of the citizenry, and
the Fourth Circuit’s exclusion of Hamdi from that realm, indicate the powerful
role that social contract and membership principles play in defining
constitutional rights. Hamdi’s application of the Quirin test for citizenship,
and Padilla’s eschewal of that test, lead to completely different outcomes.
III. CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF PSEUDO-CITIZENSHIP
AND THE APPLICATION OF LAW GOVERNING NON-CITIZENS
The debate surrounding the enemy combatant cases tends to polarize
around the proper balance that decisionmakers should strike between national
security and individual liberty. Many courts and scholars have argued that the
executive and legislative branches need flexibility to act quickly to curtail a
threat to the nation when an individual is suspected of having acted against the
interests of the nation.278 Others have argued that the criminal process is
sufficient to protect us against the actions of citizens who are unlawful
273
Id. at 713-14 (noting the government’s claim that the President had “inherent executive authority” to detain
Padilla) (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319, 320).
274
Id. at 721 & n.29.
275
Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 463
- 76; see supra notes __ and accompanying text.
276
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 691-97 (2001).
277
Padilla, 352 F.3d at 733 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
278
See, e.g., George C. Harris, Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of
National Security, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 135, 147-49 (Spring 2003); William Rehnquist, Civil Liberty and the Civil
War: The Indianapolis Treason Trials, 72 IND. L.J. 927, 932 (1997); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes,
Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During
Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 1-2, 9, 15-20 (January 2004); Carl Tobias, Detentions, Military
Commissions, Terrorism, And Domestic Case Precedent, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1371 (Sept. 2003); David Cole, Their
Liberties, Our Security: Democracy and Double Standards, 31 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 290, 291 (Summer 2003). See
also Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25, 37-38; Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 281; Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319-20); Padilla, 233 F.
Supp.2d at 587-96.
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combatants.279 This debate is dangerously anemic without an assessment of
the consequences to citizens and citizenship of a membership test that creates
different levels of constitutional protection. Is there a benefit to isolating a
class of citizens whose claim to full citizenship is perceived as questionable?
Are there implications for the citizenry as a whole when rules traditionally
applied to aliens apply to citizens? Are there implications for non-citizens?
A.

The Supreme Court: Predictions and Implications

First among these questions is what the impact of the membership test
might be on the Supreme Court’s forthcoming decisions in Hamdi and
Padilla. These cases may lead the Supreme Court to confront for the first time
whether the plenary power doctrine applies to U.S. citizens in the United
States suspected to be unlawful combatants. The Court will almost certainly
confront, implicitly or explicitly, the divergent approaches in the two cases to
using membership theory to decide the scope of constitutional protections
against federal plenary power.
Applying a membership test may lead the Supreme Court to affirm
both cases. If the Court were to follow Quirin in applying membership
criteria, it would likely conclude that Hamdi lacks sufficient association with a
U.S. community. His ties to Louisiana, where he was born, are weak because
he left there when he was a small child.280 His connection to other countries is
likely to be seen as stronger: he allegedly lived in Saudi Arabia and
Afghanistan after leaving the United States and was detained outside of this
country.281
Padilla presents a more difficult case. On the surface, his connection
with the United States seems stronger. He was born in Brooklyn, New York,
grew up in New York City and Chicago, lived in Florida, and has family in the
United States.282 Like Milligan, he has resided for a significant time in the
United States, did not reside in enemy territory, was arrested here, and on the
279

E.g., Michael Greenberger, Is Criminal Justice a Casualty of the Bush Administration's "War on Terror"?,
31 HUM. RTS. 19, 21 (Winter 2004); see Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note __ at 31 (detailing the argument that no
person is subject to detention without a criminal trial). If criminal conviction is a marker of success, then providing
the constitutional protections of a criminal trial to John Walker Lindh and Timothy McVeigh supports this view. See
United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 565, 567 (E.D. Va. 2002); United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166
(10th Cir. 1998). Lindh was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment because, like Hamdi, he allegedly fought for the
Taliban against forces allied with the United States. Id; see also United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 548-52,
564-68 (E.D.Va. 2002) (denying Lindh’s motions to dismiss on several constitutional grounds, including challenges
under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments). Nor did the criminal process fail in the case of Timothy
McVeigh’s bombing of an Oklahoma City federal building. McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1176. Perhaps of greater concern
would have been a decision to classify the initial suspects as pseudo-citizens and subject them to a military tribunal:
Arab-Americans who were initially detained after the Oklahoma City bombing. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Case
Against Race Profiling In Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675, 727 (Fall 2000).
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Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 464.
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Id.
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Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 572. See also Guerrero et al., supra note __; Serrano,supra note __.
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surface had strong ties to people and places in this country.283
Yet there is a competing set of facts that could lead to a different
conclusion about the quality of Padilla’s citizenship. In 1998, Padilla
allegedly left Florida to live in Egypt, changed his name to Abdullah al
Muhajir, and converted from Roman Catholicism to Islam at some point along
the way.284 One conclusion that the membership test may suggest is that he
re-shaped his identity in a way that distanced him from the United States and
from his own citizenship.
Considering the two cases together, it is unlikely that the Court will
view the two petitioners as foreigners in the way that the Fourth Circuit did
Hamdi, nor as the archetypal citizens that Padilla represented in the Second
Circuit’s majority opinion. It is more likely that the Court will apply some
version of the membership criteria that will result in less than full citizenship
for both. In that case, I predict that the Court will apply the plenary power
doctrine but in a way that is less deferential than when the doctrine is applied
to non-citizens. It may permit greater judicial review of executive action, but
allow the use of standards for non-citizens to govern the scope of federal
power over citizens.
The critical question, then, is whether the use of a membership test
does more good than harm. Does the membership test work? Do the criteria
test for the attributes that we seek in citizens of the United States, and does the
test protect us from citizens who mean to do the country harm? Courts seem
to use the membership test to protect the members of the social contract from
fellow citizens who align themselves with an enemy. The test, at bottom,
seems intended to act as a screening device to weed out those who are
formally citizens but who are more likely than the majority to act in a way that
is disloyal to the nation. It is, at its core, a loyalty test.285
Is a loyalty test what we need to adequately protect the nation against
disloyal individuals with formal citizenship status?286 If we assume that the
membership test and the pseudo-citizen category provide some measure of
283

Id.
Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 572; see also Serrano, supra note __.
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Seen this way, the enemy combatant cases represent a struggle for dominance between two different
dimensions of citizenship: citizenship conceived of as formal legal status versus citizenship as identity or solidarity
with a nation state. Bosniak, Citizenship, supra note __, at 455; see also Spectar, supra note __, at 271-72
(describing citizenship theories); see also Rubenstein & Adler, supra note __, at 522. If the formal legal status of the
citizen is viewed as more important than identity or solidarity in the enemy combatant cases, then constitutional
benefits will follow as soon as the individual establishes citizenship. Bosniak, Citizenship, supra note __, at 463-64.
See also Charles L. Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REV. 3, 8-10 (1970).
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solidarity with the nation-state is paramount, the cases suggest that the citizen’s loyalty must be tested before the
citizen is entitled to the benefits of societal membership: constitutional rights.
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See generally, Victor C. Romero, Proxies for Loyalty in Constitutional Immigration Law: Citizenship and
Race after September 11
, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 871 (2003).
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protection to the nation, are there negative consequences that we should be
concerned about? Both citizens and non-citizens stand to experience an
impact from these cases.
B.

Citizens

The enemy combatant cases upset three common understandings about
U.S. citizenship: (1) that citizenship imbues the citizen with constitutional
rights and privileges that are greater than those granted to non-citizens,287 (2)
that those rights and privileges apply to all citizens equally,288 and (3) that
citizenship, once acquired by birth or naturalization, is a virtually permanent
and stable status.289
A category of pseudo-citizens for whom constitutional protections are
equal to or lesser than those of non-citizens challenges each of those
understandings. Applying to citizens legal principles that were originally
created to govern non-citizens challenges the first understanding that citizens
have greater constitutional rights than non-citizens. Establishing a hierarchy
in which full citizens are entitled to greater constitutional protections than
pseudo-citizens challenges the second understanding that constitutional
benefits apply equally to all citizens. Redefining citizenship to create a hybrid
citizen/non-citizen category unsettles citizens’ expectations of the permanency
and stability of their citizenship status.
The framework of the membership test seems to ameliorate these
concerns in part. Most citizens have sufficient ties to the national community
so that they would escape the pseudo-citizen category. However, the use of
membership criteria in the unlawful combatant cases is not explicit, and its
contours are vaguely defined. Courts may apply the membership test one way
or another to support the result they find attractive. Citizens may become less
certain about the level of power that the federal government has, which may
create uncertainty about who they can associate with and what they can say or
do.
Nevertheless, the majority of citizens will not be directly affected by
the malleability of citizenship categories. Of greatest concern are citizens on
the margins of membership, those likely to be perceived as less than full
citizens. For them, the use of the plenary power doctrine in the current enemy
combatant cases raises troubling questions. The membership test and the
categorizations that spring from it have their roots in the origins of the plenary
287

See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (stating that “[i]n the exercise of its broad power over
naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens”).
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See Black, supra note __, at 33-66; Karst, supra note __, at 173-242; Bosniak, Citizenship, supra note __, at
450.
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See Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1471 (1986); Afroyim v. Rusk,
387 U.S. 253 (1967); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
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power doctrine. There is a danger that the doctrine’s historical use to exclude
certain groups like the Chinese and Native Americans may find echoes in
decisions concerning certain groups, like Arabs and Muslims, who are
currently perceived with suspicion.290
Exacerbating this danger is that the pseudo-citizen category upsets
established norms about the permanency of citizenship. Outside of the enemy
combatant context, it is the citizen, and not the government, who has control
over her citizenship status. The pseudo-citizen category and the membership
test undermine the principle that a citizen cannot lose her citizenship status
unintentionally. In Afroyim v. Rusk, the Supreme Court placed the burden on
the government to prove that the citizen intended to renounce her
citizenship.291 Afroyim requires the government, in effect, to explicitly alter
the individual’s formal citizenship status before it may treat the citizen as a
non-citizen. Classifying the citizens in Quirin and Hamdi as pseudo-citizens
allowed the government to apply rules governing non-citizens without bearing
its burden of altering the individual’s formal citizenship status. When the
Fourth Circuit accepted without rebuttal the President’s designation of Hamdi

290
Volpp, supra note __, at 1592-99 (describing the creation of the Arab Muslim terrorist citizen as a group
separate from the American public). These concerns gain clarity in light of the Japanese internment cases, decided
contemporaneously with Quirin. See Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and
the Construction of Race Before and After September 11, 34 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 1, 22-31 (2002); Susan
Akram & Kevin Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of
Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. OF AM. LAW 295, 337 (2003); Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under
Siege: Japanese American Redress and the ‘Racing’ of Arab Americans as ‘Terrorists,’ 8 ASIAN L.J. 1, 8-9 (2001);
Liam Braber, Korematsu’s Ghost: A Post-September 11th Analysis of Race and National Security, 47 VILL. L. REV
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as an enemy combatant and applied the plenary power doctrine,292 it
presumed, counter to Afroyim, that Hamdi intended to renounce his citizenship
and any identification or solidarity with the nation.293
C.

Non-Citizens

The impact on non-citizens is more attenuated but no less significant.
The application to citizens of rules governing non-citizens reaffirms the lower
level of constitutional protections accorded to non-citizens as well as their
exclusion from the social contract.294 The greatest concern that these cases
raise is that the rules being applied to citizens were originally crafted for noncitizens, without the foresight that they might later cross the citizenship divide.
David Cole has observed that immigration law acts as a testing ground for
rules that would be unacceptable to the citizenry at the time.295 In times of
national stress, those rules come to be applied to citizens as well.296
Thus, the enemy combatant cases suggest that we need to be cautious
about the rules we craft for non-citizens. Relying too heavily on a formal
distinction between citizens and non-citizens will fail to anticipate the effect
on citizens of rules now being crafted for non-citizens.297 If courts break
down the division between citizen and non-citizen in ways that lessen
constitutional protections for both, then we all must be concerned about the
rules that apply to enemy combatants, whether citizen or alien.
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